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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Purpose 
Since 1991, Article J. 4 .1. in the Maastricht Treaty1 states that: 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy shall include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defense. 
This statement represented the first official formulation that included security and defense 
policy in the search for common positions. Probably no part of the European integration 
has brought about more doubts and disbelief than the attempt to create a common foreign 
policy, in which the Member States of the European Union would ultimately speak with a 
single voice in world affairs. 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess how integrated the European Union has become 
in terms of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Foreign and 
Defense policy (CFDP)2. Ultimately, I hope to arrive at some conclusions about future 
path(s) of this common security and defense policy. 
To achieve this purpose I will use two theoretical approaches, which are commonly 
used to study integration phenomena, and see how well they account for the present 
situation in the European security and defense. These approaches are the 
intergovernmental and the neofunctionalist approaches. 
The intergovernmental approach is applied to study and analyze the Single European 
Act (1986), the Treaty of Maastricht (1991), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), and the 
decisions of the European Council of Helsinki (December 1999). The provisions of these 
treaties and of the Helsinki Document are analyzed according to four categories. The first 
category looks at the objectives and tools of a common foreign and security policy. The 
second category concerns the decision-making and institutional framework. The third 
category deals with the voting procedures. And, finally, the fourth relates to the defense 
dimension. 
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The neofunctional approach is used to look at the practical arrangements that have 
taken place in the Western European Union (WEU) and the Eurocorps. These two 
organizations are the embodiment of Europe's defense ambitions. The period covered for 
the WEU runs from the _mid-1980s until the present and focuses particularly on the results 
of the WEU Declarations of 1991 and subsequent declarations, as they are the foundation 
for the WEU, as it is known today. The period covered for the Eurocorps starts at the 
beginning of the 1990s until the decisions of the European Council of Helsinki in 1999. 
The analysis is carried along five categories: membership, structure, missions, means, and 
cooperation/accomplishments. 
During this study, many different questions and issues will emerge that reflect the 
complexity of the whole process and may pose stumbling blocks towards a genuine 
integration. 
Possible questions include: What will be the elements of a European foreign and 
security policy? What will be the objectives and means, the capacities and organizations, 
and the level of cooperation? What will be the role of the European Union? What will be 
the balance between the European Union and the Member States? What will be the 
relation between a European security and defense policy and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)? What will be the role of the Western European Union (WEU) and 
the Eurocorps in creating this policy? 
The first set of issues focuses on the variety of states and variety of organizations with 
different memberships. At least 15 countries that have different heritages in terms of 
history, language, culture, affinities and priorities are involved in this process. The 
economical integration that has been taking place during the past 50 years has definitely 
helped bridge some gaps but, in terms of security and defense cooperation, the Union is 
still at an embryonic stage. The different and overlapping memberships (European Union, 
NATO, Western European Union and Eurocorps), as well as in some cases different status 
of membership (Appendix A), add to the difficulty of achieving a common foreign policy. 
The different memberships of the Western European Union, the issue of Turkey being 
NATO member and Associate Member of the WEU (but with no prospect of becoming a 
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EU Member), the neutral countries3 of the EU, all can bring along major difficulties to 
cope with. 
A second set of issues focuses on the political will and the capabilities of the European 
States. With the parallel development of the Economical Monetary Union (EMU), many 
countries have had to cut budget spending and deficits in order to reach the convergence 
c1teria4. This has had impacts on defense budgets in most of the countries. A recent 
report,5 of the Ministers of member countries of the WEU, has listed Europe's lack of vital 
assets for a modern defense force. Among the missing assets are the intelligence 
gathering, the collection and analysis facilities, the strategic airlift, and command and 
control. The question is to know what kind of defense capacity Europe wants to have. 
A third set of issues focuses on the relation with NATO and the United States (U.S.). 
There is no single American view of the security and defense initiatives in Europe. Some 
people support it because they believe that a stronger Europe is in the interest of the U.S., 
some want the U.S. out of Europe. Others are relaxed about it as they believe it will not 
amount to much and some fear that it will reduce American influence and weaken the 
Atlantic Alliance. 6 In any case, the advantages of a European Union better able to act 
independently and forcefully should be weighed against the danger of exacerbating 
differences between Europe and the United States, duplicate costly NATO structures and 
assets, and alienate NATO's non-EU members. 
1.2. The Theoretical Support 
International integration process is to be understood as the process whereby two or 
more states form a new entity, which can in some sense be described as a political 
community.7 
There are two basic questions arising from this definition, which divide scholars of 
integration. The first is what kind of political community is or should be the result of a 
process of integration. The second question is what conditions and strategies cause the 
process of integration to proceed, to stagnate or to break down. 
4 
The first question relates to the distinction between those who take the integration to 
be directed towards the formation of a supranational political authority and form a sort of 
state-model, and those who emphasize instead the propensity of peoples to interact and 
cooperate across state boundaries and form a sort of community-model. 
The second question relates to the debate of which variables account best for the 
integration process. On one side, you have those who look at the technology, the economy 
and the society as the source towards integration. On the other hand, there are those who 
stress the primacy of politics. The success depends on the responsiveness and political 
will of the elite and their ability to strike bargains within the limit of acceptability for the 
public opinion. 
In their chapter, "Conclusions: Community politics and institutional change"8, Robert 
Keohane and Stanley Hoffinann argue that the European Community is an experiment in 
pooling sovereignty, not in transferring it from states to supranational institutions. "The 
European Community can best be viewed as a set of complex overlapping networks, in 
which a supranational9 style of decision-making, characterized by compromises upgrading 
common interests, can under favorable conditions lead to the pooling of sovereignty. 10" In 
their view, theories and concepts of political integration, could help us understand the 
contemporary dynamics of European integration. They contend that the expansion of 
functional tasks and other phenomena - a neofunctionalist approach, depends on the 
bargains between major governments - an intergovernmental approach. They believe that 
after such a bargain has occurred, tasks can expand as a result of linkage between sectors. 
Such expansion, however, is not automatic. 
Hence, both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism can aid us in evaluating the 
evolution of a common foreign, security and defense policy. The link established by 
Keohane and Hoffinann about the dependence of the expansion of tasks on the bargains 
between governments will help understand the process and account for the likelihood that 
it will succeed in the future. 
5 
1.2.1. The intergovernmental approach 
Moravcsik11 defines three components, which characterize what he calls 
intergovernmental institutionalism. These are intergovernmentalism, lowest-common-
denominator bargaining, and protection of sovereignty. 
Intergovernmentalism, according to Moravcsik, has been present since the beginning 
of the European Community. The community has been based on interstate bargains 
between its Member States. The formulation and negotiation of major initiative has taken 
place in the Council of Ministers or the European Council, 12 where each governments see 
the EC through the lens of its own policy preferences. 
The lowest-common-denominator component stands for what is acceptable to all the 
parties. This can mean a lack of efficiency as the price for a feasible compromise. 
Moravcsik states that in this process the larger states exercise a de facto veto over 
fundamental changes in the scope or rules, while small states can be bought off with side-
payments. Therefore, the bargaining results tend to converge towards the large states' 
profit. Also, the tool that can impel a state to accept an outcome is to threaten of 
exclusion. 
If the decision of joining a regime involves sacrifices of national sovereignty, there 
also remain mechanisms of protection of this sovereignty. Policymakers often demand the 
unanimous consent of regime members to sovereignty-related reforms. Policymakers will 
also avoid giving open-ended authority to central institutions that might infringe on the 
sovereignty of their states. 
1.2.2. The neofunctionalist approach 
A second approach is neofunctionalism. It grew out of the failures of functionalism, 
because it seemingly contained no theory of politics. Therefore I will say a couple of 
words about functionalism: what it supposed to and why it failed as a theory. 
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Functionalism in its international context is closely associated with the writing of 
David Mitrany. In his book13, A Working Peace System, Mitrany argued that the root of 
international conflict was the division of the world into "competing political units". 
According to Mitrany, a world federal government would eliminate these divisions but 
would be impossible to establish given the disregard for pacts and the recurrent 
nationalism. He therefore called for a functional approach. This approach would bypass 
the political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies 
through which the interests and lives of all the nations would be gradually integrated. This 
functional integration would be pragmatic, technocratic, and flexible. Functional 
cooperation arises in response to perceived "needs" that cannot be met by governments 
acting individually. Mitrany understood the needs as the objective conditions that create 
global interdependencies. The theory predicted the autonomous appearance of 
international organizations in specific functional areas as needs developed and as national 
leaders perceived common interests. Technocrats could than proceed to community 
building through quiet problem solving. Once a functional organization was established, 
additional forces for institutional growth and development were set in motion. This 
process is known as "spillover". Functionalism failed because it assumed that economic 
problems could be solved by technical experts apart from the political process. However 
without some understanding of politics, certain choices made in the European integration 
process could not be explained.14 
From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, a group predominantly composed ofU.S. social 
scientists, led by Ernst Haas, sought to explain the development of the European 
Community by addressing the failures of functionalism. These new theorists were called 
neofunctionalists. They drew on democratic theory, systems theory, group theory, and a 
host of other approaches to produce a scientifically rigorous explanation. 15 This 
neofunctionalist approach is used to explain the cooperation through the organizations that 
are the subject of Chapter 4, although I am aware that empirical and theoretical problems 
cropped up against this approach. So much so that even Ernst Haas16 declared 
neofunctionalism obsolete in 1975. 
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I will use Leon Lindberg's study17 of political integration and its neofunctionalist 
implication and transpose it to the field of security and defense integration. In my opinion, 
neofunctionalism can be used to understand the developments of the Western European 
Union and the Eurocorps. This while neofunctionalism was created, in particular, in an 
attempt to explain the phenomenon of integration in Western Europe. 
Security and defense integration are a form of political integration. Lindberg defines 
political integration as a process but without reference to an end point. He distinguishes 
two specific components to political integration One is the process whereby nations forgo 
the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each 
other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process 
to new central organs. The other, the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center. 
According to Lindberg, the first part of the definition refers to the process of sharing 
and of delegating decision-making, which is likely to affect the governmental structure in 
eac;h state involved. The second part of the definition directs the attention to the 
perceptions and resulting behavior of the actors in each of the states involved. Therefore, 
as the place of the decision-making changes, so will the tactics of groups and individuals 
seeking to influence the decision-making. Lindberg uses political integration as a process 
because this conceptualization relies on the perception of interests by the actors 
participating in the process. Integration takes place when these perceptions fall into a 
certain pattern and fails to take place when they do not. 
To show how political integration can be made to occur, Lindberg distinguish two 
types of conditions. The first type is a set of background conditions. These conditions 
include a degree of homogeneity in both levels of development - social, economic and 
political - and basic values, a network of transactions which give rise to a mutual 
knowledge and a sense of mutually relevance, compatible decision-making processes, 
compatible expectations. And also a belief that future problems can be met in a mutual 
acceptable manner and that integration will enhance the satisfaction of needs to a degree 
otherwise not possible. Since my topic is the security and defense integration of the 
European Union, I assume that these background conditions are met. 
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The second type includes four conditions derived from Lindberg and Haas' research 
on Western Europe. The first condition requires the development of central institutions 
and central policies. This condition is necessary in order to represent the common interests 
and to accommodate conflicts that will arise. Lindberg considers four main aspects to be 
linked to this condition: True integration occurs when the desires of both sides have found 
a place in which the interests of the parties fit into each other. The integrative impact of 
central institutions depends in part on the competencies and roles assigned to them and 
also how the institutions define their role (formal, informal, decision-making, 
institutionalization ... ). Central institutions lacking real competency may develop a 
consensus that will influence the national and international decision-makers that do 
determine policy. Finally, interactions of central institutions may have latent effects that 
contribute to integration. Participants in the activities may develop multiple perspectives, 
personal friendships, a shared expertise, all of which may reflect upon the national 
government and influence future policymaking. These latent effects are only significant if 
the concerned individuals are influential at national level. 
The second condition requires an elite activation. If integration is going on it is 
expected to find a change of behavior of the participants. It is important, therefore, to 
identify the aims and motives of the relevant groups, the conditions of their emergence 
and the means by which they seek to attain the centers of power. A lack of direct contact , 
to individuals and such groups often results in the organization being no more than a 
forum of intergovernmental consultation and cooperation. 
The third condition requires that the tasks of an organization must be inherently 
expansive to overcome what Haas calls "the built-in autonomy of functional contexts". 
This happens when tasks are so dependent on the context they were shaped that they do 
not result in a cumulative process. Here a spillover effect is expected to happen. This 
refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in 
which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in tum create 
a further condition and a need for more actions, and so forth. Spillover can occur when 
there is convergence of goals and expectations, or when there is lack of agreement 
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between governments and activities are delegated to the organization, or through pressure 
of elite groups or by the creation of situation that can only be dealt by the organization. 
The fourth and last condition is that no integration can succeed in the absence of a will 
to proceed on the part of the member states. Therefore the integration will often reflect the 
continuity of national policy aims. Conflict of interests among states will have to be 
resolved, through procedures like "the minimum common denominator" which involves 
relatively equal bargainers who exchange concessions while never going beyond what the 
least cooperative among them is willing to concede. Through accommodation by 
"splitting the difference" which involves a similar exchange of concessions except that 
conflicts are ultimately resolved somewhere between the final bargaining positions 
because of the mediator role performed by a third party. Or finally through 
accommodation on the basis of "upgrading common interests" which implies the 
redefinition of the conflicts so as to work out a solution. 
1.3. The Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic of the thesis, how it will be studied and which questions 
are closely related to it. The evolution of a common foreign, security and defense policy 
for the European Union is examined utilizing the intergovernmental and neofunctionalist 
approaches. These two approaches have been described in this chapter. 
The idea of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is definitely not new and 
since it will help understand the developments of the last 15 years, Chapter 2 traces the 
historical background of the efforts towards a political and defense union. A brief 
historical account is given starting after the Second World War until the development of 
the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC is treated in more details as it 
represents the first visible efforts in foreign policy of the member states of the European 
Union and it is the forerunner of the developments that we witness today. 
Chapter 3 analyzes, through an intergovernmental perspective, the provisions of the 
Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1991) and the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1997). The analysis is carried out according to four categories. The first category looks at 
the objectives and tools of a common foreign and security policy. The second category 
concerns the decision-making and institutional framework. The third category deals with 
the voting procedures. And, finally, the fourth relates to the defense dimension. A section 
is also devoted to the document issued from the European Council of Helsinki (December 
1999). This document is important as it represents a new turn in the evolution of the 
CFSP. The provisions of the Treaties reflect the cooperation or non-cooperation between 
countries. Partial conclusions will be drawn at the end of this chapter. 
Chapter 4 looks at two organizations, the Western European Union (WED) and the 
Eurocorps and assesses how they reacted, in term of the neofunctionalist approach, to the 
provisions of the Treaties and later documents discussed previously. The first part is 
devoted to the WEU. How it has evolved, what are the signs of expansion and how it 
constitutes a possible failure in terms of defense integration. The second part studies the 
Eurocorps in the same way as the WEU, except that in this case it might be a possible 
future success in terms of defense integration. The analysis of both organizations is 
carried along five categories: membership, structure, ITI1ss1ons, means, and 
cooperation/ accomplishments. 
Chapter 5 encompasses the general conclusions of the whole study as well as 
reflections, recommendations and perspectives for the future. 
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CHAPTER 2. A EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: 
PRECURSORS OF COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY 
POLICY 
2.1. The Historical Background 
The attempt towards a common foreign, security and defense policy for the European 
Union is not a new one. To provide an overall icjea this section gives a chronological 
account of the different attempts. 
The onset of the Cold War made the defense of Western Europe a pressing necessity. 
In March 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed among five European countries. 18 It was 
meant to promote economic, social and cultural collaboration and included an undertaking 
of mutual assistance in the case of armed aggression. With this Treaty, the Europeans sent 
a signal to the United States that they were ready to do their share in the defense of 
Western Europe. 19 The following year the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) was created which 
added to the five members of the Brussels not - only the United States and Canada - but 
also Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal. The Brussels Treaty was given 
institutions that gave it the potential to develop into a regional organization. It was, 
however, not foreseen that they would concern themselves with foreign policy separately 
from the common defense policy, which was necessary to underpin the military nature of 
the Treaty. These :functions were in practice transferred to NATO, so that there was no 
specifically European framework for the discussion of foreign and security policy. 20 
In October 1950, with the Cold War and the hostilities in Korea raging in the 
background, the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany was seriously 
considered to meet the growing Soviet threat. The French Prime Minister, Rene Pleven, 
launched the idea of a European Defense Community (EDC) which was complemented 
with a move towards a European Political Community. It was argued that a defense 
community could not exist without a measure of democratic control through political 
institutions, which went beyond the provisions of the EDC draft Treaty. Therefore, the 
whole initiative provided for the creation of an integrated European army in which small 
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national military units of Germany would be subsumed under collective European control. 
The institutions would include a Board of Commissioners, Council of Ministers, an 
Assembly, and a court of Justice. The army would then receive political guidance through 
the supervision of a European Defense Minister and the Assembly. This Assembly would 
be a federal-type political institution that would have embodied the European Political 
Community. Debates among European member states went on for some time, but finally 
in August 1954, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty and work on a 
European Political Community immediately halted.21 The gap left in European defense 
policy was filled by the initiative of the United Kingdom to extend to Germany and Italy 
the membership of the Brussels Treaty in October 1954. This Treaty became the Modified 
Treaty of Brussels (MTB) and created, in the wake of the London Nine Power 
Conference, the Western European Union (WEU). The essential purpose of this 
organization was to facilitate the entry of Italy and Germany into NATO by providing a 
mechanism to monitor the rearmament of these countries. 22 
In the early 1960s, three years after the establishment of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) there appeared a new desire, under General Charles de Gaulle, to begin 
the political cooperation in Europe. The proposed European policy of de Gaulle consisted 
of establishing a Europe with an independent political authority capable of asserting itself 
in the world. It would be independent from the United States and would provide a higher 
authority through which the sovereign Member States would be able to exercise political 
control over the activities of the Community institutions. 23 Between 1961 and 1962, the 
French Foreign Minister Christian Fouchet prepared two proposals known as the 'Fouchet 
Plans' .24 The first draft Treaty Fouchet I had as its objective a common foreign policy and 
a common defense policy in cooperation with other free nations as well as the 
development of cooperation in the fields of science and culture. A council at the level of 
Heads of Government would meet every four months and Foreign Ministers would meet 
every three months. The existing Assembly of the Communities could debate and make 
recommendations in any areas covered by the Union. A Political Committee made up of 
senior Foreign Ministry officials would prepare and implement the Council's decisions. In 
the negotiations that followed many concessions and compromises were made. Their 
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discussions led to the draft of a new proposal known as the Fouchet II, yet this new draft 
proposal was ultimately rejected. This failure carried the following lessons for the future: 
it proved vain to try to impose an inter-governmental superstructure on the Community 
order; the United Kingdom could not be left out of an arrangement and special attention 
needed to be paid to the relation with the United States in any such proposal. 25 
In 1963 General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer signed a treaty of cooperation 
known as the French-German Elysee Treaty.26 This treaty had as its objective the 
reconciliation of the French and German people through regular meetings and cooperation 
between Head of States and government, at least twice a year, and between Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defense and between the representatives of Education. In 
the area of defense, however, this project turned out to be premature. Only in the 1980s 
did concrete results occur when President Francois Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl tried to revive it. By 1988, three initiatives related to European security and defense 
could be observed. The first one was the agreement to create a French-German brigade. 
This brigade totals 5,000 troops since 1996, and is based in Donaueschingen, 
Immendingen and Miillheim (Germany). The second result was the organization of an 
intergovernmental Council on Defense and Security, and third the organization of a 
bilateral field exercise called "Bold Sparrow". 27 Following another French initiative, the 
Western European Union was reactivated in 1984. It was then regarded not as a decision-
making body but as a forum where European countries might discuss defense and security 
problems among themselves. 28 
The major efforts at political cooperation began in 1969 at the Hague Summit. There 
the six members29 of the European Economic Community (EEC) reaffirmed the need of a 
politically unified Europe. Following this, the "Davignon Report" was adopted in 1970 in 
Luxembourg creating the European Political Cooperation (EPC). It stated that 
"cooperation related exclusively to foreign policy and its purpose was to ensure mutual 
understanding and to strengthen Member States' solidarity on major international policy 
problems through meetings between their diplomatic services". 
In 1973, at Copenhagen, they decided to step up the rate of meetings, seek common 
approaches, and implement concerted diplomacy. Originally set up as an informal body of 
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EC member country heads of state or foreign ministers for consultation on matters of 
foreign policy, it developed over the years into a formalized process of consultation and 
· 30 cooperat10n. 
2.2. The European Political Cooperation 
2.2.1. Important stages of a prospective EC collective foreign policy 
The fundamental reason for the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
was to reinforce the external dimension of the European Community not covered by the 
Treaties31 and so to adapt the European diplomacy to the changes in the international 
environment which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. The EC governments wanted to play 
a role in securing global peace and the welfare of mankind, commensurate both with the 
principles that governed the relations among the Member States and with Europe's 
economic power. Another incentive came from outside the EC, was the growing number 
of third countries that perceived the EC to be a valuable partner to consult and associate 
with.32 
The nature of the EPC was a umque one and, therefore, extremely difficult and 
complex to analyze. It was a decentralized intergovernmental system, where commitment 
to reach common positions was based on the build-up of mutual trust, increased 
communication and socialization among participants as well as good will. It performed 
actions on selective, irregular and conditional base and in secrecy. This last element 
brought an additional burden on gathering the adequate information to study it. Decisions 
and policies variables used in traditional foreign policy research were virtually non-
existent. There was no forthcoming "European interest" but a combination of each 
Member States' interest. Added to these individual objectives of the member states' 
foreign policies were the parallel interrelated foreign policy processes such as the Atlantic 
Alliance and bilateral relations. 33 Pragmatism has been recognized as being one of the 
main features governing EPC. The fixing of rules and procedures in official texts before 
they have proven their usefulness is alien to EPC procedures. Therefore, the study of EPC 
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is usually carried out through the examination of its evolution, the analysis of the common 
declarations and positions, the impact on third countries and the results of common 
declarations. 34 
As indicated above, the EPC was born at the Hague Summit of December 1969. The 
statements of the European leaders during the summit indicated that there was an 
accumulation of positive political will translated into the widespread readiness to take 
steps towards the strengthening (i.e. admission of Great Britain and others) and the 
deepening of the Community. The summit had as result that the head of States instructed 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to study the best way to achieve progress in political 
unification. Therefore, a committee was assembled composed of the political directors of 
the Member States' Foreign Ministers, under the chairmanship of the Belgian political 
director Etienne Davignon. The report35, produced by this committee in 1970, and often 
referred to as the Davignon or Luxembourg report, developed the EPC into an informal 
cooperation network among the member states. 36 
The objectives were much more modest. William Wallace described the outcome of 
the Luxembourg Report as follows, "EPC as a procedure, promised everything and 
nothing. There was no commitment to agree, but simply to consult on all important 
questions of foreign policy."37 There was an emphasis on "consultation" and "exchange of 
views", with the Commission invited only if deemed necessary by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs. A formal schedule for ministerial meetings was established and a 
Political Committee and ad hoc working groups were created. Both the European 
Parliament and the Commission were left at the fringes. 38 
By the time of the Paris Summit in 1972, the momentum of political will weakened if 
not almost disappeared. The declarations of political leaders before and during this 
summit became more pragmatic and the statements less ambitious and more cautious. 39 
This summit instructed the Foreign Ministers to prepare a second report on EPC, which 
was submitted to the leaders at the November 1973 Summit in Copenhagen. The report, 
called Copenhagen Report, outlined what was previously agreed on political cooperation 
and gave EPC its final character. It established its working rules throughout the 1970's 
and 1980's. It recognized the role of the Correspondent Group, increased the frequency of 
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meetings, established the COREU telex network, and pushed for a greater coordination 
between member state embassies in third countries. In short, the system was not 
fundamentally changed. The changes were only marginal, but they formalized the 
intergovernmental practices developed during the preceding years. It remained a 
mechanism for common analysis, reciprocal exchange of information, and at best common 
public statements when views did not fundamentally diverge. 40 
The creation of the European Council, at the Paris Summit of December 1974, was a 
major event in European integration. It reinforced intergovernmental mechanisms and 
weakened the supranational institutions ones established by the Treaty of Rome. The 
reasons invoked for the creation of the European Council was the need to meet the 
demands of a period in which the detailed guidance of the Treaties was running out, 
external circumstances had grown hostile and the capacity of the Council of Ministers and 
of the Commission to tackle these problems had declined. The European Council became 
the highest organ. It developed over time four major functions in Community politics. 
First, it provides a forum for free and informal exchanges of view between the 
Community leaders. Second, it deliberates and decides on issues within the jurisdiction of 
the Treaty, on political cooperation and on common Europeans concerns not belonging to 
any framework. Third, it generates overall impetus, mobilizing the Community's 
resources on major issues facing the member States. And fourth, it acts as a court of 
appeal on difficult dossiers when agreement is not reached at lower decision-making 
levels. The European Council, not being the product of a treaty, draws its sole 
legitimization from the summit communique. Its existence has thereafter been confirmed 
in successive texts of the European Council itself, the Commission, the Council of 
· Ministers, the European Parliament and in the reports of various personalities and 
committees. 41 
A series of crises - the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the American hostages in Iran 
and the Polish domestic crisis - highlighted the slowness of the EPC to respond and 
pushed the Community to issue the London Report in 1981. This was the third report 
signed by the Ministers on EPC, and formed together with the Luxembourg and 
Copenhagen report the constituent papers of EPC. This report was in certain instances a 
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step forward and in other a formal acknowledgment of what was already established 
practices. It differentiated itself from the two previous reports in the sense that there was a 
more pragmatic approach and in four areas - institutional, crisis procedures, security and 
the political commitment. Institutionally it formalized the Commission's participation and 
it reinforced the presidency. Crisis procedures were established, the Political Committee 
or a ministerial meeting could be convened within forty-eight hours at the request of three 
member States. Regarding the scope it introduced timidly the political aspect of security, 
without given a defense or military dimension to the European Communities. And finally 
it reconfirmed, a decade after the launching of EPC, the members' political commitment 
to political cooperation. 42 
There were some failed attempts outside the EPC to deepen and institutionalize 
foreign policy cooperation. Among these attempts was the Tindemans Report in 1975, 
which is an illustrative example of the profound difficulties that exist in the way of even 
relatively small changes in initiative towards political integration. In this report, the 
Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans recommended to act in common in all the main fields 
of the external relations whether in foreign policy, security, economic relations or 
development aid. This was to defend the European interests as well as to use the collective 
strength to support law and justice in the world discussions. He also stated that it made 
increasingly less sense in the modern world to maintain the distinction between low and 
high politics and urged an end to the distinction between EPC and EEC meetings of the 
Foreign Ministers. This would have had as consequence a single decision-making center 
for both Community and EPC affairs. Another ambitious recommendation was that EPC 
should be revised from its existing voluntary concertation to a legally binding obligation 
on the Member States to comply with common foreign policy decisions. The report was 
judged too federalist and became a failure. The European Council in The Hague in 
November 1976, which examined the report, did not welcome the idea of binding 
obligation and compliance. It politely stated that: "the construction of Europe must also 
make the best use of possibilities for cooperation between the governments in those areas 
where the. Member States are prepared to exercise their sovereignty in a progressively 
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convergent manner. This form of cooperation in the field of foreign policy must lead to 
the search for a common external policy."43 
The real "saut qualititatif'44 in the field was only achieved in 1986 when the EPC 
received its contractual basis with the Single European Act. 
2.2.2. The EPC practices 
The EPC is the predecessor of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Its 
practices cover the period from 1969 until 1991 (with its formalization in the European 
Single Act of 1986). EPC's main areas of activity were the foreign policy challenges 
facing the member states. Among the challenges were the East-West relations, including 
the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), the cooperation within 
the United Nations, the trouble spots in the Middle East, southern Africa, Central and 
Latin America and the fight against international terrorism. The political and economical 
aspects of the European security were dealt with. Attention was also paid to all political 
developments in the world that have repercussions on Europe in some form or other. 
Special devotion was also showed to the observance of human rights worldwide.45 
The means available to the EPC system to carry out the above-mentioned activities 
were very limited and mostly indirect. The only tangible ones were the occasional 
common declarations. They set out a number of political orientations. When common 
declarations referred to the employment of negative or positive economic sanctions a real 
dilemma could appear about the implementation question. This is because implementation 
issues could be controversial46 and unpredictable, as the EPC had no direct means of 
sanctioning a third country or of compelling a partner member state to comply with the 
common position. The implementation mechanisms were in national hands and the 
occasional use at the European level depended completely on the willingness of the 
member states. 47 
One of the most visible activities of the EPC was the political dialogues held with 
either an individual third country or with a group of states. Group-to-group relations were 
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primarily designed to seek publicity because it was seen as worth to support integrationist 
' trends in other parts of the world. Due to the numerical size and lack of homogeneity the 
concrete results of such group-to-group relations have often been modest. For example, 
the Euro-Arab Dialogue 48 suffered from this divergent pattern of interest. 49 
The dialogue with individual third countries served to inform them about EPC results. 
In some cases the relations with one country had special purposes. Examples of this are 
the relations with Turkey and Morocco. Turkey's NATO membership and early 
association with the EC were initially dominant. However, with Greece's application to 
the EC, this changed and the political dialogue offered some compensation for Turkey 
having to remain outside. It also permitted Europe to express deep concern over the 
human rights situation in Turkey. Morocco's association with EPC is to be understood as 
a response to the country's unsuccessful application for membership in 1987 and also, 
with Spain's entry in the EC, to strengthen ties with the countries of the Mediterranean 
Basin.50 
In practice, the greatest load of work fell on the Foreign Minister and the political 
Director of the Presidency51 country. Since the Presidency changed every six months the 
Troika formula52 was adopted. This helped to achieve greater continuity and to support 
confidence building towards third countries' government which were regularly confronted 
with new faces. · The general rule in the working habits of EPC was that all the initiatives, 
beside things that are dealt with in a procedural way, required the consent of all Member 
States. No Presidency, be it large or small, could go beyond the general acquisition. And 
as each government wished to make its Presidency a success, cautiousness and the search 
for compromise always prevailed. 53 
In comparison to its legitimate right of speaking on behalf of the EC in the EC's 
sphere of competencies, the Commission's participation in the political dialogue was a 
very limited one, this. It was associated with the proceedings but had no decisional 
rights. 54 
Until 1986 there was no permanent secretariat and even after 1986, the EPC's 
Secretariat was shaped and directed to avoid the emergence of a new and independent 
body. Its Head and staff assisted the Presidency and worked under its authority. 55 
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CHAPTER 3. THE TREATIES AND THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
3 .1. The Treaties and The Subsequent Declarations 
3.1.1. The Single European Act (SEA), the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Amsterdam Treaty 
The three treaties in the European integration process that deal with the issues of 
foreign, security and defense policies have been developed primarily in the 1980's and 
1990's. Those treaties, products of Intergovernmental Conferences (ICG), are the Single 
European Act (SEA) of 1986, the Maastricht Treaty (MT) of 1991 and the Amsterdam 
Treaty (AT) of 1996. 
Since 1970, the European Political Cooperation had developed only on a purely 
governmental level at the margins of the Rome Treaty. It covered the strict diplomatic side 
of security and had an effect of strictly limiting integration. In 1986, the EPC received its 
contractu~l basis from Title III of the Single European Act and an EPC secretariat was 
established in Brussels. The conventional view on this Act was that despite the 
legalization of the procedures, it failed to make substantive transformation to the 
functioning of EPC. The principal aim had been to codify the procedures, which had been 
elaborated and refined since 1970. 56 
A review of the dispositions of the SEA was planned for 1992. Several events, 
however, speeded the process up. The review took place during the ICG leading to the , 
drafting of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. According to Martin Holland57, the reform of 
EPC was a necessity for a number of reasons. First, the constraints of the consensus 
principle had become increasingly apparent - the ability of the member states to speak 
with one voice had proven to be somewhat of a charade. EPC happened to be strong on 
issues of secondary importance and weak on crucial issues. Second, from the perspective 
of Germany and a majority of Community members, a balance between political and 
economical union seemed indispensable. Third, external imperatives forced the 12 States 
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to reassert their role in the international community ( e.g. the events in Eastern Europe 
since 1989 and the unification of Germany). Fourth, the anticipated enlargement of the 
EU, with several applicant candidates (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Sweden and 
Turkey) and the potential applicants (Switzerland, Eastern and Central European 
countries) would likely produce further problems in the application of the consensus 
principle .. Fifth, there was the inadequacy of traditional diplomacy. For instance, the use of 
economical instruments that fell under the authority of the Commission required some 
unity among the different EU members. And finally, sixth, the Gulf crisis underscored the 
inability of the EPC to take rigorous and decisive actions. 
The Maastricht Treaty went further than the Single European Act by providing explicit 
provisions related to the CFSP. It also allowed those provisions to be amended during the 
Intergovernmental Conference (JGC) of 1996. In turn, the 1996 conference led to the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 58 All of these actions were the result of a compromise among the 
countries (especially Germany) that were not satisfied with the Maastricht Treaty. In 1998 
and 1999, several other declarations were made that would lead towards a new turn in the 
evolution. 
3.1.2.The Declarations of the European Council of Helsinki (December 
1999) 
In December 1998, the French-British Summit held in Saint-Malo on European 
Defense produced a declaration called the Saint-Malo declaration. This declaration was 
important since it represents an explicit plea for a direct European role in defense matters. 
It also set the stage for further meetings on the topic. Presented in a synthesized way this 
document contains the following ideas. 
The acts of the Union, referred in the Amsterdam Treaty, have to become reality. 
Therefore, the Union should have an autonomous capacity of action with credible military 
forces. Appropriate structures have to be developed. In addition, the improvement of the 
industrial and defense technology base has to be achieved. All these efforts, however, 
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should respect the commitments of Member States to NATO and respect the particular 
situation of certain Member States. 
Due to the situation in Kosovo, the European Council in Cologne on June 3- 4, 1999, 
mainly focussed and decided on important security, foreign policy and defense issues. 59 
Building on the Saint-Malo declaration, the EU leaders agreed that the EU should have the 
ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management 
tasks defined in the Amsterdam Treaty. The document issued at Cologne consists of a 
declaration and the report of the Presidency. The report is divided into five categories 
(introduction, guideline principles, decision-making, implementation, modalities of 
participation and cooperation) and contains the ideas that will serve as a model for the 
Helsinki document. At the Cologne Summit, the EU had given itself, for the first time, an 
independent military capability that aimed for effective EU-led crisis management in 
which both NATO and non-NATO members60 of the EU can participate fully, and on an 
equal basis, in EU operations. The EU leaders also decided unanimously to have Javier 
Solana Madariaga, former Secretary General of NATO, as the High Representative for the 
CFSP. 
The purpose of the European Council of Helsinki in December 1999, was to 
strengthen the Common European policy on security and defense by taking steps in 
military and non-military aspects of crisis management. The document issued is based on 
the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty (Treaty on the European Union) an~ the guiding 
principles agreed at Cologne. It consists of a declaration and two reports. 
The first report states that the Member States have set for themselves the following 
headline goal to be achieved for 2003. Cooperating on a voluntary base, the Member 
States should be able to deploy rapidly and then to sustain forces capable of the full range 
of Petersberg tasks in operations up to corps level. This corps would consist of about 
50,000 to 60,000 persons, be deployable within 60 days and sustained for at least one 
year. Member States have also decided to develop collective capability goals in the fields 
of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. The European NATO 
members who are not members of the EU and candidate members are invited to contribute 
to the improvement of European military capabilities. 
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Concerning the relationship with NATO and non-EU countries, there is a commitment 
to establish the appropriated structures for dialogue and information on issues related to 
security and defense policy and crisis management. Modalities to insure full consultation, 
cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO will be developed. Russian, 
Ukraine and other countries engaged in political dialogue with the Union may be invited 
to take part in EU-led operations. 
The second report calls for the enhancement and better coordination of the Union's 
and Member States non-military crisis response tools. These crisis response tools are, 
experience in civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal 
rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring, and so on. This 
enhancement would result from the drawing up of an Action Plan that would strengthen 
the synergy of national, collective and NGO resources, that would enhance and facilitate 
the EU' s contributions in other organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, and that 
would ensure the inter-pillar coherence. The process involves defining frameworks and 
personnel, making inventories, creating databases to maintain and share information, 
setting up a coordinating mechanism and a rapid financing mechanism. 
3.2. The Analysis of the Treaties and Documents 
This section will analyze the provisions of the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Amsterdam Treaty, and the actions taken in the Helsinki Documents according to four 
categories. The first category looks at the objectives and tools of a common foreign and 
security policy. The second category concerns the decision-making and institutional 
frame. The third category deals with the voting procedures. And, finally, the fourth deals 
with the defense dimension. The provisions on European cooperation in the sphere of 
foreign policy in the SEA are located in Title Ill. This Title is composed of one article, 
Article 30, which is divided in 12 points. The provisions on a common foreign and 
security policy as well as a defense dimension in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties 
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are to be find under Title V. The Maastricht contains 11 articles (J-Jll) and the 
Amsterdam treaty contains 18 articles (11-28). 
3.2.1. The objectives and tools of the foreign and security policy 
3.2.1.1. The SEA 
Article 30.1 stated at the outset that the general objective assigned to EPC is to 
"endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy." The words 
matter a lot, as there is no mention of the necessity, or the desire to establish a common 
policy. Concerning the binding character of Title III, the formulation of Article 30.2(a) 
(c), 30.3(a) and 30.6(a) are extremely vague in character. There is no shortage of 
commitments to consult and inform each other, to "take full account of the positions of the 
other partners" and to "ensure the common principles and objectives are gradually 
developed and defined." There is, however, no provision clearly establishing an obligation 
to reach a common position or to implement it. 
3.2.1.2. J:he Maastricht Treaty 
The objectives of the CFSP are clearly formulated in paragraph 2 of article J.1. These 
are "to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the 
Union, to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways, to 
preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of 
the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Act and the objectives 
of the Paris Charter." And also "to promote international cooperation" and "to develop 
and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms." Paragraph 3 specifies the means through which these objectives 
can be achieved. These are the establishment of systematic cooperation between Member 
States and the gradual implementations of joint actions. The legal instruments of article 
189 EC Treaty, which are the directives, the regulations and the decisions, are not 
available in the field of the CFSP. 
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Among the tools of the CFSP is systematic cooperation. This means that Member 
States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign 
and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is 
exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action ( art J.2.1 ). 
To ensure this systematic cooperation Title V provides two special kinds of legal 
instruments: common positions and joint actions. 
Common positions (art J.2.2) refer to defining the political positions of the Union on 
any issue corning within the sphere of the CFSP. Member States are bound to ensure that 
their national policies conform to the common positions ( art J.2.2) and are also bound to 
uphold the common position in international meetings (art J.2.3). Joint actions are 
measures not only to lay down policy objectives but also to organize the steps to be taken 
in actively pursuing those objectives. According to Article J.3 .1 the Council shall decide, 
on basis of general guidelines from the European Council that a matter should be the 
subject of joint action. Once decided on the principle, the Council shall lay down the 
specific scope and the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action. 
If necessary the Council will specify its duration, and the means, procedures and 
conditions for its implementation. The Council can define those matters on which 
decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority (art J.3.2). In case of change in 
circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council 
shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions 
(art J.3.3). Member States are committed towards joint actions in the positions they adopt 
and the conduct of their activities (art J.3.4). The obligation to inform (art J.3.5) 
constitutes an important feature of the definition of joint action. Member states can take 
without consultation urgent measures regarding the general objectives of the joint action, 
but they must inform the Council immediately of any such measures (art J.3.6). Finally 
there is the "opting out" possibility in case of major difficulties for Member States (art 
J.3.7). This "opting out", however, is not automatic: a Member State can not disengage 
from a joint action without asking first permission to the Council, which decides in the 
end. 
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3.2.1.3. The Amsterdam Treaty 
Like article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty (MT), article 11 of the Amsterdam Treaty 
(AT) covers all the areas of foreign and security policy. There are still five objectives but 
some have been changed in their content. First, the role of the Union is clearly affirmed, 
almost at the expenses of the Member States. Article J.1 in the MT says "The Union and 
its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy". 
Article 11 in the AT says "The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and 
security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy". The same emphasis can 
be found in the definition of the second objective. In the MT the definition is "to 
strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways" and in the AT "to 
strengthen the security of the Union in all ways". Second, the objective about the 
safeguarding of the common values, fundamental interests and the independence of the 
Union is completed with the addition of the respect of the "integrity of the Union in 
conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter." The fourth objective, about 
the preservation of peace and strengthening of international security, gets the addition 
"including those on external borders". Finally, article 11.2 in the AT stipulates that "The 
Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity". 
In order to pursue the objective of article 11, article 12 enumerates a list of the tools of 
the CFSP. The tools are, the definition of the principles and the general guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy, the decisions on common strategies, the adoption of 
joint actions and common positions, the strengthening of systematic cooperation between 
Member States in the conduct of policy. Also, in comparison with Maastricht, Amsterdam 
does not speak of "establishing" but "strengthening" systematic cooperation between 
Member States in the conduct of policy (art 12). 
The European Council defines principles and general guidelines for the CFSP, 
"including for matters with defense implications" ( art 13 .1). The European Council also 
decides on common strategies. These strategies involve areas where the Member States 
have important interests in common, and they have to set out the objectives, duration and 
the means that the Union and the Member States have to make available (art 13.2). The 
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Council recommends common strategies to the European Council and implements them 
by adopt~gjoint actions and common positions (art 13.3). 
Joint actions (art 14) address "specific situations where operational action by the 
Union is deemed to be required". Common positions ( art 15) define "the approach of the 
Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature". 
The Amsterdam Treaty introduces a new concept, the common strategies, which are 
defined at the highest level of the European institutions - the European Council. It seems 
also that common strategies, joint actions and common positions receive a better 
definition, which will help in identifying the different acts of the CFSP. The distinction 
between joint action and common position, however, remains vague. What will make the 
difference when it will be time to choose between "specific situations" (joint actions) or 
"particular matters" ( common positions)? The modification of article 13 .1, in which the 
European Council now also defines principles and general guidelines for matters with 
defense implications, is a step forward. 
3.2.1.4. The Helsinki Document 
The objectives stated in this document are to provide the EU with the necessary 
means and capabilities so it can assume its responsibilities for common European security 
and defense policy. To this purpose there will be put in place permanent political and 
military institutions. A headline goal, that has to be reached by the year 2003, has also 
been set. The goal is that through voluntarily cooperation the Member States will be able 
to deploy forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks, as set out in the Amsterdam 
Treaty. It will include also the most demanding task in operations, which is the 
deployment of forces up to corps level (50,000-60,000 persons). The deployment should 
occur in 60 days and it should be sustained for one year. The capabilities pooled together 
will need to have the following features: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, 
flexibility, :mobility, survivability, and command and control. 
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3.2.2. The decision-making and institutional framework 
3.2.2.1. The SEA 
The decision-making is in the hands of the High Contracting Parties. They undertake 
to inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest. This to 
ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through 
coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint action ( art 
30.2). 
Title III also introduces a senes of procedural refinements and a number of 
innovations. Articles 30.3(a) (b) clarify and extend the role of the Commission. It provides 
for "the Council of Foreign Ministers and a member of the Commission shall meet at least 
four times a year within the framework of Political Cooperation". It also recognizes the 
"Commission as fully associated with the proceedings of Political Cooperation". In article 
30.4, the European Parliament is to be "closely associated with European Political 
Cooperation", with the Presidency regularly informing the Parliament and ensuring that 
the views of the Parliament are dully taken into account. Article 3 0 .10( c-g) codifies the 
roles of the political directors, correspondents groups and working groups and creates 
EPC's own secretariat. Article 30.6(a) endows EPC for the first time with the 
responsibility "to coordinate positions more closely on the political and economic aspects 
of security". 
3.2.2.2. The Maastricht Treaty 
Title I, article C of the Treaty provides the existence of a unique institutional frame for 
the entire Union and its three pillars. This desire of a unique frame can be observed by the 
transfer t9 the Council of the competencies in the field of political cooperation and 
through the participation of the Commission and the European Parliament in the CFSP. 
The role of each institution is defined as follows. The European Council defines the 
principles and general guidelines for the CFSP (art J.8.1). The Council makes the 
decisions necessary for defining and implementing the CFSP on the basis of the general 
guidelines defined by the European Council. It also ensures the unity, consistency and 
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effectiveness of action by the Union (art J.8.2). The Commission, however, is to be fully 
associated with the work carried out in CFSP field (art J.9) and possesses a right to submit 
proposals to the Council (art J.8.3). The European Parliament's role is reinforced (art J.7). 
The Presidency has to consult it on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP 
and shall ensure that that its views are duly taken into consideration. The Parliament may 
ask quest_ions and make recommendations to the Council. 
Article J. 5 gives the Presidency the responsibility to represent the Union in matters 
coming within the CFSP and to implement common measures. To carry out those tasks it 
shall be assisted, if needed, by the previous and next Member States to hold the 
Presidency. This arrangement is usually referred to as the "troika" formula. The 
Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks. Article J.5.4 also imposes the 
obligation to the Member States to represent the Union in international organizations and 
at international conferences and keep the Member States that do not participate informed 
of any matter of common interest. Member States, which are member of the United 
Nations Security Council, also have the obligation to concert and keep the other Member 
States fully informed. 
Other decision-making activities are also set out in the Maastricht Treaty. The Political 
Committee's function is expanded (art J.8.5). It will monitor the international situation in 
the areas covered by CFSP and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering 
opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. The question 
of expenditure is regulated by article J. 11. Finally, article J.10 and article J. 4. 6 provide 
dispositions concerning eventual reviewing of the security provisions. 
3.2.2.3. The Amsterdam Treaty 
The innovations of the institutional setting from this treaty are: the creation of the 
function of High Representative for the CFSP, the creation of a unit of policy planning 
and early warning, and the budgetary mandate attributed to the European Parliament. 
The function of High Representative for the CFSP appears in a new article 18.3 of the 
AT. The High Representative will also be the Secretary-General of the Council and will 
assist the Council and the Presidency in CFSP matters. More precisely, the High 
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Representative will contribute to the formulation, preparation and implementation of 
policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request 
of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties (art.26). Article 
18.5 also specifies that the Council may appoint a special representative with a mandate in 
relation to particular policy issues. There is also a modification of the Troika composition. 
In Maastricht the Troika was composed of the previous, current and future Presidency. 
Article 18.4 now states "The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the 
next Member State to hold the Presidency". 
The provisions about the creation of a policy planning and early warning unit do not 
appear in Title V, but in the declaration number 6 adopted during the Intergovernmental 
Conference. This unit is to be placed under the responsibility of the High Representative. 
It is to be composed of persons from the general secretary of the Council, the Member 
States, the Commission, and the Western European Union. Its mission is to analyze the 
international developments that are related to the CFSP, evaluate the interests of the 
Union and warn the Union in case some events could have serious repercussions on the 
Union. Article 21 does not change anything concerning the role of the European 
Parliament. But article 28 with the budgetary prerogative ( operational expenditure charged 
to the community budget) improves the Parliament's role in the CFSP. 
3.2.2.4. The Helsinki Document 
According to Helsinki, the decision-making process is in the hands of the Council, 
which decides the Union's involvement in all phases and aspects of crisis management 
and Petersberg tasks. Each Member State can participate fully and on equal footing. The 
commitment of national assets is based on sovereign decision. Beside the Defense 
Ministers, which are involved in the Common European Security and Defense Policy 
(CESDP), and the General Affairs Council, three new permanent political and military 
bodies will be created. 
There will be a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels 
composed of representatives of senior or ambassadorial level. It deals with the aspects of 
the CFSP and the CESDP. In case of crisis it exercises the political control and strategic 
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direction of the operation. The Military Committee (MC) will be composed of the Chiefs 
of Defense. This Committee gives military advice to the PSC and provides military 
direction to the Military Staff. The Military Staff (MS) will provide military expertise and 
support to the CESDP and the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. 
It also performs early warning, situation assessments and strategic planning for the 
Petersberg tasks. 
Finally, the High Representative/Secretary General has to insure the efficiency and 
consistency of the CFSP and the development of the CESDP. During the time necessary to 
create these new bodies, the Secretary general should make full use of the assets of the 
WEU. 
3.2.3. The voting procedures 
3.2.3.1. The SEA 
Although not explicitly written in any of the points of Article 30, the consensus 
principle is applied in the formulation of common positions. 
3.2.3.2. The Maastricht Treaty 
Unanimity rule is the method by default for the CFSP since the European Council, 
which defines the principles and general orientation, has this kind of voting procedure 
only. Also, the general rule for the Council is to act unanimously (art J.8.2). However, 
article J.3 introduces the possibility of qualified majority voting for joint actions. This 
qualified majority procedure cannot apply to matters that have implications in the defense 
field (art J.4.3), nor is there any possibility of qualified majority voting in areas where the 
Council has failed to define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by qualified 
majority. 
3.2.3.3. The Amsterdam Treaty 
Even if the common positions and joint actions require unarunuty voting to be 
adopted, there are two major innovations. A qualified majority61 is used for the adoption 
of joint actions, common positions or any other decision taken on the basis of a common 
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strategy decided by the European Council on the recommendations of the Council ( art 
14.2, 14.4 and 23.2). There is a progress here in comparison with article J.3 of the MT, 
where qualified majority could only occur after two stages of unanimity voting. However, 
this act of qualified majority can only occur for application of a common strategy decided 
by unanimity by the European Council. Article 23 .2 also says that should be taken into 
account, any decision adopted by the Council, implementing a joint action or a common 
position. This introduces some complexity, since in this case the procedure of article J.3 in 
the MT stays partially in application. There is double unanimity decision, in the European 
Council and in the Council, the execution of a joint action or common position occurring 
by majority voting. The use of a qualified majority is subject to important prerogatives of 
national policy. "If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated 
reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by 
qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken." The Council may, acting by a qualified 
majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by 
unanimity" (art 23.2 par. 2). This has led to think that the compromise of Luxembourg62 
was written for the first time in a European Treaty. 
The "constructive abstention" procedure is the other major innovation (art 23.1). This 
procedure is meant to reduce the risks of deadlock of decisions. Member States who make 
a formal declaration of constructive abstention are not obligated to apply a particular 
decision, while nonetheless accepting that the decision commits the Union. Two situations 
are envisaged with different implications. In the case of a formal declaration of a State, 
this state is not obligated to apply the decision. There is, however, a limited number of 
abstentions possible: "If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this 
way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with article 148(2) 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted" 
( art 23 .1 ). The second situation concerns the abstention where there is no formal 
declaration. In this case the States that are abstaining have to apply the adopted decision. 63 
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3.2.3.4. The Helsinki Document 
Since the document is based on the provisions laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty, 
one should refer to that Treaty for the voting procedures. However, the decision to commit 
assets remains a sovereign decision. 
3.2.4. The defense component 
3.2.4.1. The SEA 
There is no mention of any defense dimension at this point. 
3.2.4.2. The Maastricht Treaty 
Article J.4 is considered as an important breakthrough in the field of defense-policy 
and defense. Paragraph 1 states the following "The common foreign and security policy 
shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual 
framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense". 
In paragraph 2, the Western European Union (WEU), which is considered an integral 
part of the development of the Union, becomes in some way the military instrument of the 
European Union. The WEU not only implements decisions but also participates in their 
elaboration. Paragraph 4 asserts that there will be no prejudice to the specific character of 
the security and defense policy of certain Member States and that the CFSP has to be 
compatible with the obligations linked to NATO. 
3.2.4.3. The Amsterdam Treaty 
Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty (AT) introduces, in comparison with article J.4 of 
the Maastricht Treaty (MT), some innovations. In Maastricht the definition of the CFSP 
was to include "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual 
framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense." 
The Amsterdam Treaty says "all questions related to the security of the Union, including 
the 'progressive' framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a 
common defense, should the European Council so decide." 
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What is important here is the link established between a progressive framing of a 
common defense policy and the cioser relation between the European Union (EU) and the 
Western European Union (WEU). Paragraph 2 of article 17.1 states that "The WED is an 
integral part of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability'' 
and it "supports the Union in framing the defense aspects of the common foreign and 
security policy. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the 
WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide". This closer cooperation 
affects especially the decision-making and implementing process concerning the 
Petersberg Tasks64 that are now included in the CFSP through article 17.2 and are 
considered as a major innovation in comparison with Maastricht. Another difference is the 
way the EU addresses the WEU. Article J.4.2 of the MT says "The Union requests the 
WEU, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense 
implications." Article 17.3 of the AT states "The Union will avail itself of the WEU to 
elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense 
implications" introducing an element of subordination of the WED to the EU. 
Four other elements are worth mentioning about article 17 of the AT. They are not or 
almost not present in the provisions ofMaastricht. Paragraph 3 of article 17 stipulates that 
"the policy of the Union shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and the 
defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain 
Member States", the same provision is found in article J.4.2 of the MT. This raises the 
question of the chances that some day the Union might achieve a common defense policy, 
especially when the rest of the paragraph states that "the Union shall respect the 
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized under the 
North Atlantic Treaty". 
Paragraph 3, line 3 reads "all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to 
participate fully in the Petersberg tasks. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of 
the WEU,, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States 
contributing [ ... ] to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-
taking in the WEU." This seems to mean that what concerns the Union, the differences of 
membership status in the WED does not matter, as long as the states are members of the 
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EU. The changes related to the defense dimension of the CFSP are now referred only to 
the provision about the general review in accordance with article N of the Treaty ( art 
17.5). In the MT, article J.4.5 referred to the Article XII of the Brussels Treaty. Finally, 
the question concerning the cooperation in the field of armament is briefly mentioned in 
the last paragraph of article 17. 
3.2.4.4. The Helsinki Document 
' 
The Helsinki Documents deals mainly with the defense dimension, of which the 
details h~ve been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
3 .3. General Conclusions 
3.3.1. The SEA 
The EPC, created during the past 30 years, has a number of features that contributes to 
its specificity and deficiencies. Among these features are the lack of a legal basis and 
institutional structures. EPC was the result of political agreements between Member States 
of the Community that occurred outside the formal provisions of the Treaty of Rome. No 
decisions have ever had a binding character. The only existing constraints were the 
obligation of information and consultation before the adoption of a final position. 
However, even if associated, the Commission had no power of initiative or proposition. It 
was involved in the discussions but not in the decision process. The implication of the 
European Parliament was the result of practices already accepted in previous reports. 
There was also a total absence of the Court of Justice. Another feature is the 
intergovernmental cooperation system based on the consensus rule. EPC had an 
intergovernmental character that excluded any transfer of sovereignty. No decision could 
be taken without the consent of all the Member States. The opposition of one member was 
enough to block any decision. Therefore, although there was a socializing65 effect within 
the Community and the steps taken with the Single European Act, EPC belonged to the 
realm of declaratory diplomacy. 66 
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3.3.2.The Maastricht Treaty 
The Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) of the Treaty of Maastricht was a 
response to the perceived inadequacy of the EPC in the face of the changes that were 
taking places in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Among its accomplishments it 
introduced five important new elements. 67 
First, a common defense policy and a common defense are mentioned for the first time 
in the text of a treaty. This formulation does not, of course, resolve the European defense 
question. Nevertheless, it goes beyond the political and economical aspects of security. In 
terms of integrated defense, the declaration about the WEU as being an integral part of the 
Union's evolution is also a significant progress. The link between the WEU, the EU and 
NATO is based on an asymmetric relationship: in favor of the Union for the political 
questions, and in favor of NATO for the operational matters.68 This approach allowed 
different Member States to conceal their real interests and positions. These formulations 
have an important de facto result - a greater entanglement, complementarity and 
transparency between the EU, the WEU and NATO. 
Second, the idea of joint actions gained in substance. One of the criticisms of the EPC 
was that it was no more than a declaratory policy. The MT tried, through the procedure it 
introduced, to move from principles to the execution of joint actions. Even if unanimity in 
the European Council and in the Council are required to decide whether a field is the 
object of a joint action, once launched a joint action can only be modified by another 
unanimous decision. Joint action being part of the intergovernmental sphere the possible 
use of a qualified majority voting has encountered many obstacles. However, in a 
declaration69 attached to the treaty, the Member States are requested to avoid using 
unanimity rule in the case where qualified majority would be more appropriate. 
Third, the Commission during the EPC era had always been considered as out of place 
m the diplomatic activity and had been excluded from participating. With the new 
provisions the Commission is acquiring a partial right of initiative, which has in the 
community context an important symbolic significance. 
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Fourth, it is now possible to give a mandate to the Presidency. Article J.5.2 not only 
tries to personalize the CFSP, but also avoids individual national initiatives and gives the 
Presidency the role of an unique negotiator in international organizations and conferences. 
Fifth and finally, the secretariat of the Council becomes the secretariat of the CFSP, 
which works in the sense of the rationalization of the instruments of the CFSP. 
A nutnber of deficiencies in the MT have been identified in different areas. 7° First, the 
institutional set-up of the CFSP remains inadequate. The experience with the Yugoslav 
war led to the conclusion that two major structural constraints continue to hamper efficient 
and timely decision-making process. The first is the unanimity rule. This rule reinforces 
any existing divergence among Member States on both the principles and the substance of 
the CFSP. The second constraint is the lack of a single decision-making center and a 
centralized political leadership. The fact that the Presidency rotates every six months is 
not conducive to a consistent leadership for the CFSP. Additionally there is no real 
impulsion organ to conduct CFSP. The hybrid structure of the MT consisting of the 
coexistence of a community approach and an intergovernmental approach71 provides for a 
lot of complication and confusion. Also there appears to be no coherence in the external 
action of the Union, since a distinction is maintained between issues of economical 
matters and political matter. 
Second, the objectives of the CFSP enumerated in article J.1.1 seem to be vague and at 
the same time very ambitious. Basically, the message is to promote democracy and peace, 
but on what should the Union concentrate: Europe or the world? Should the Union 
promote openness or should it privileges, its own comfort? There is clearly a lack of 
vision for the future of the Union. It makes apparent the lack of political will on the part of 
some Member States. Some are indeed reluctant to relinquish control in areas, which they 
consider to be the ultimate expression of national sovereignty. Also article J.4.1, due to an 
absence of deadline for the first objective ( definition of a defense policy) and the use of 
the condi,ional for the second objective ( a common defense), invites compromise and not 
decisive engagement. 
Third, the instruments to carry out the objectives seem to be confusing and 
insufficient. The definition concerning the available instruments is insufficient. It is 
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difficult to see a clear distinction between what is meant with common positions and joint 
actions. There is a lack of adequate military resources 72 and a serious lack of financial 
means as well. Article J.11 draws a distinction between administrative expenditure 
incurred by the institutions for the purpose of the CFSP and operational expenditures 
resulting from the implementation of the provisions concerning the CFSP. The 
administrative part is charged to the budget of the European Communities (art J.11.2), but 
the operational expenditure will either be charged to the same budget or to the Member 
States (according to a scale to be decided). It is, however, far from easy to distinguish 
administrative from operational expenditures. 
In comparison to the EPC, the MT can be characterized as a step in the right direction. 
However, the impression left by the analysis of the content is that a certain status quo 
remains. This appears in the sense that the situation inherited from the past seems to be 
shaped into text. Whereas, important questions such as the regrouping of the CFSP, the 
politic of cooperation and other community politics related with external affairs under a 
common frame, stayed untouched. If the text gives some content to the concept of joint 
actions, it does not modify the decision process, which remains unanimous voting. The 
major achievements are that, for the first time, a defense policy and defense are mentioned 
in the texts, that the Western European Union is defined as being an integral part of the 
Union's development, and that the Commission received an initiative right in the process. 
3.3.3. The Amsterdam Treaty 
The accomplishments and deficiencies of the Amsterdam Treaty (AT) are not as clear-
cut as with Maastricht. One thing is sure the innovations have definitely improved the 
complexity of the whole mechanism. The CFSP seemed to have been improved in the 
following ways. The first improvement is the creation of the function of a High 
Representative for the CFSP, cumulative with the function of Secretary General of the 
Council. This helps insure a better visibility and gives a direct interlocutor for third 
countries on matters of CFSP. The second improvement is the creation of a policy 
planning and early warning unit headed by the High Representative. This unit's major task 
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is to provide policy assessments and more focussed input into policy formulation. This 
unit is, however, not mentioned in Title V but in a Declaration annexed to the AT. For the 
decision phase, unanimity continues to be the rule. However, the introduction of the 
"constructive abstention" procedure and the possibility of qualified majority voting will 
probably improve the decision-making procedures. The execution phase stays in the hands 
of the Presidency, assisted by the High Representative. 
One might argue that the overall consistency is strengthened by the enhanced role of 
the European Council in defining common strategies for the Union's foreign policy. These 
common strategies will set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made 
available by the Union and the Member States. The Council and the Commission are 
responsible to insure consistency. To do this they are at best committed to cooperate. The 
Commission's role has improved little. Regarding the Presidency, even if now assists by 
the Secretary-General of the Council, under the troika system it is only left with the advice 
of the Member State that will hold the next presidency. 
Two other positive elements to be mentioned are the inclusion in the AT of the 
Petersberg tasks and that a large amount of the operational expenses will be charged to the 
community budget. 
Beside a statement towards a further integration of the WEU into the EU, no progress 
has been made towards a common defense policy. Also the AT has not addressed the 
question of means. 
The reading of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty suggests that, as with the 
Maastricht Treaty, compromises have been struck between contradictory European 
visions. The achievements of the AT have definitely not lived up to the expectations 
induced by the "spirit" of the Maastricht Treaty. Some analysts73 have argued that the 
Amsterdam Treaty was not a starting but an ending point, where the limit of 
intergovernmental logic has been reached. They argued also that, in the future, with more 
than fifteen Member States this kind of treaty and process will be impossible. In the 
Amsterdam Treaty, there have been no improvements, in terms of representation and 
execution, of the role of the Commission in CFSP matters. Instead the status quo remains 
with the predominance of the Council. The promotion of the qualified majority rule is 
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impeded by restrictions, which in the long run might reduce its effects. The role of the 
High Representative has not been defined precisely. Its utility and the evolution of this 
function will probably depend on the personality of the Representative and the relations 
that will be established with the consecutive Presidencies. The objective of a common 
defense policy stays as conditional as it was in the text of the MT. Even if the Amsterdam 
Treaty affirms that the CFSP includes a "progressive" definition of common defense 
policy, there is no more definition than in the Maastricht text of what the content of a 
common policy should be. The integration of the Petersberg tasks in the AT will probably 
work in favor of a politico-military legitimacy of the Union. One can, however, ask what 
those are worth if the Union stays without its own military means. The relation between 
the WEU and the EU stays vague. There is an element of subordination of the WEU to the 
EU, but there is no mention of a fusion of both organizations. Some countries following 
the lead of Britain are hostile to the idea of a fusion, either because of a neutral status or 
because of their attachment to NATO as provider of a common defense. 
3.3.4. The Helsinki Document 
The ~chievements of the three treaties previously discussed have been rather modest. 
The document of Helsinki brings an important tum. This time the Member States have 
committed themselves to achieve tangible results by working towards the setting up of a 
multinational army corps in order to face situations described as the Petersberg tasks. 
There is no question of a European army so far, or of a collective defense, which 
remains a prerogative of NATO. This was the sine qua non condition to have the neutral 
member countries of the Union and Denmark to agree on having some sort of capacity of 
action for the Union. However, the door is left open for future developments in that area. 
Future developments were the Modified Treaty of Brussels, which instituted the WEU, 
might serve as base for a collective defense provision. 
The document of Helsinki is important because it implies the creation of new 
structures (political committee, military planning cell and headquarter) within the Union. 
This will have important consequences for the existence of the WEU, the development of 
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the Eurocorps and the relations with NATO and other European countries not member of 
the European Union. It is important also because it reflects the will of four large countries 
in Europe (Britain, France, Germany and Italy) to take up responsibilities. The position of 
Britain is somewhat surprising since with this move it displays a radical tum from policy 
with what was practiced in the past. It would be naive to believe that Britain has suddenly 
subscribed to the idea of European political and defense Union, instead strategic reasons 
as well as the fear of being excluded from the game may account for this behavior. 
Although excluded from the EURO process, Britain can nevertheless play a role in the 
core of the European affairs through this involvement in the field of defense. 
The idea of setting up a corps of 50,000 to 60,000 men for a period of at least a year is 
a realistic one. It might seem a ridiculous amount, but with the rotation process it 
involves 200,000 men in a one-year operation. These means, however, have to be linked 
with the goals and objectives the EU countries want to achieve, in this case crisis 
management and Petersberg tasks. 
It is yet too early to evaluate how this new setting of commitments and structures 
within the Union will be working. There are, however, four reasons suggesting some 
optimistism. First, the structures put in place are copied from the structures used in 
NATO, which have proved to be working over time. Though the structures in the 
European Union start from nothing, a transfer of the functioning elements of the WEU to 
the European Union will most likely occur. This action, of course, calls into question the 
future of the WEU, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Second, contrary to the WEU, the EU is a global organization (i.e. economical, 
commercial, financial, social) as such a non-decision or a lack of action after these 
commit~ents might put a serious strain on its credibility and affect other sectors not 
related with security and defense issues. 
Third, the choice of Javier Solana as first High Representative for the CFSP also led to 
optimism. As mentioned before, the function of High Representative has not been defined 
as such and will depend on the personality and relations of the person in charge. As 
former General Secretary of NATO, Solana knows the representatives of the different 
countries and especially the United States, which can only help in keeping the 
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transatlantic link in a good posture and clarifying the Union's intention. He also has 
acquired experience in working in a multinational environment, and he has lived through 
the enlargement process of NATO and the out-of-area operations conducted by NATO. 
Fourth, in comparison with the previous treaties, the Helsinki Document mentions a 
deadline. The new structures and commitments have to be in place and operational by 
2003. A good sign is that the inauguration of the interim structures took place as planned 
on March 1, 2000. 
All these good intentions, however, will reqmre a sustained political will and the 
development of more European military capabilities in areas such as intelligence, strategic 
transport, command and control, as well as efforts to coordinate and build multinational 
European forces. 
43 
CHAPTER 4. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND 
THE EUROCORPS IN THE NEOFUNCTIONALIST 
PERSPECTIVE 
4 .1. Introduction 
In th~ European security architecture five regional organizations involve themselves in 
security and defense issues. There is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE)74, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Western European Union {WEU), and the Eurocorps. The choice to study 
the WEU and the Eurocorps in this chapter is due to the fact that both organizations share 
the same objective, which is the creation of an independent European security and defense 
identity and capability. They are, as we will see in the next sections, linked to each other 
and to the European Union. 
The path followed by the WEU is an unusual one but, nonetheless, an interesting one. 
Whatever the intensity of its role through the years, the WEU has always been an actor in 
the security architecture of Europe. Since the early 1990s it has been closely associated to 
the development of the European Union. The purpose of this chapter is to review how the 
MT, the AT and decisions made in the European Union have influenced the WEU and 
what might be the final result. To achieve this goal, the neofunctionalist perspective will 
be used. 
With the decisions taken at the EU level in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999, a new light 
has been shed on the Eurocorps. It was previously linked to the WEU under the relation 
Force Answerable to the WEU. The Eurocorps appears now, with its structure and its 
decision and action capacity, as the possible foundation for a European rapid reaction 
corps or at least one of the defense tools of the EU. This reason explains my choice to 
study it ~s a possible viable alternative to the WEU, considering the fate of the latter, in 
the process of European security and defense integration. 
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4.2. The Western European Union 
4.2.1. The history 
To understand the dynamics happening in this context it is important to start with a 
portrayal of its evolution. Simon Duke in his book75 argues that the WEU, due to its 
evolution and conflicting loyalties (EU versus NATO), could suffer from acute 
institutional schizophrenia and even collapse in a near future. Although it is too early to 
predict what will eventually happen with the WEU, his statement heads in the right 
direction. 
On the 17th of March 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Brussels. It was meant to be a treaty of economical, 
social, cultural collaboration, and collective self-defense. Oriented against the rearmament 
of Germany and meant as response to the Soviet moves to control the countries of Central 
Europe, it also translated into practical arrangements some of the ideals of the European 
movement. 
In October 1954, the signing of the Paris agreements amended the Brussels Treaty and 
created the WEU as a new international organization. It also provided for the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Italy to become full members. The three main objectives of the 
organization were to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic 
recovery, to afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression, to 
promote the unity, and encourage the progressive integration ofEurope.76 Its headquarters 
were located in London and its parliamentary assembly, composed of representatives of 
each member country, was installed in Paris. Different entities were instituted from the 
beginning. One entity was the Council that met at ministerial and permanent 
representative levels once a year. In the future this Council will meet twice yearly involve 
both foreign and defense ministers. Another entity was the Permanent Council, chaired by 
the Secretary General that would meet 10 times a year in London. It was responsible for 
confirming the continued adherence of members to the Brussels Treaty, for supervising 
the work of the Agency of the Control of Armaments (ACA) and the Standing Armaments 
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Committee (SAC), and responding to the WEU assembly of parliamentarians. The 
presidency rotated annually. The ACA was based in Paris and monitored 1) the fulfillment 
of the Brussels Treaty's provisions on the size and forces, 2) the West German 
manufacture of weapons and 3) the stocks of weapons held by member states. Its 
permanent staff studied the information from governments and other sources and 
undertook armament inspections. The SAC, also based in Paris, sought to improve 
cooperation on the development, standardization, production, and procurements of 
armaments. 77 
The creation and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the WEU' s failure to establish a clear sense of purpose and identity, made the WEU enter 
a stage of inactivity that would last 30 years. The WEU did not develop as a military 
organization during the Cold War. Instead, its security mandate provided that it would 
work in close cooperation with NATO and rely on NATO for information and advice on 
military matters. Its economic, social and cultural roles were gradually taken over by the 
Organization of Europe for Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe. Its 
political activities lost much of their relevance with the development of the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). However, during these years it permitted the integration of 
the Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance, the restoration of confidence 
among Western European countries by assuming responsibilities for arms control, the 
settlement of the Saar problem, and the consultation between the European Community 
founding Members States and the United Kingdom (this until 1973 - year the United 
Kingdom joined the European Community). 78 
The early 1980's witnessed a revival of the debate on European security. The 
discussion concerning the European pillar in NATO were leading nowhere and it was not 
possible to define a European defense policy in the framework of the European 
Communities. 79 While the strengthening of the Soviet military system deployed against 
Western .Europe was the subject of growing concern, the announcement by President 
Reagan of the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) aroused fears in 
Europe that the U.S. might separate itself from Europe in the event of a major conflict. 
Therefore, on the initiative of the Belgian and French governments, a joint meeting of the 
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Foreign and Defense Ministers within the WEU framework was held in Rome in October 
1984. The purpose was to reactivate the WEU on a new basis. It led to the adoption of the 
Rome Declaration, which is regarded as the certificate of the WEU' s renaissance. 
From the start, debate arose about the WEU' s purpose and its relations with the other 
organizations. It began to be pulled between those determined to use it to promote a 
distinctly European security entity, such as France and some Benelux countries, and those 
determined to use the WEU to strengthen the European pillar in NATO, such as Great 
Britain and the Netherlands. Among the stated objectives of the Rome Declaration the 
Ministers recognized the "continuing necessity to strengthen western security, and that 
better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but 
also to an improvement in the common defense of all countries of the Atlantic Alliance". 80 
This statement underlined the attachment to the Atlantic Alliance. Besides reaffirming that 
the WEU Council should consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of 
the world, the structure remained quite minimal. It consisted of the Council, composed of 
Foreign and Defense Ministers that would meet twice a year, a staff and several working 
groups and a parliamentary Assembly who gathered four times a year. This reactivation 
did not create a decision-making body but a forum where seven, later nine, European 
countries might discuss defense and security problems among themselves. The WEU' s 
action was limited to the generation of numerous reports and communiques. 81 
The adoption of the The Hague Platform on European Security Interests in October 
1987 was the first concrete result of the WEU's early period of reactivation. It defined the 
conditions and criteria for European security and the responsibilities for the WEU 
members in regard to defense, arms control and disarmament, and East-West dialogue and 
cooperation. It stressed that the security of the Alliance is indivisible and that efforts 
should be made to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. 82 At the same time, the 
decision was made to open negotiations with Portugal and Spain regarding their accession 
to the Mpdified Brussels Treaty (MTB). 
The European Community's failure to deal with the security issue posed by Saddam 
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait resulted in the WEU becoming the EC's existential security 
identity - existential in the sense that at that time it was the only means the EU could rely 
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upon m the field of security and defense. Subsequent developments would result in 
expanding the links between the WEU, NATO and the EC and make the WEU the bridge 
between the two organizations.83 In the period of 1987-1991, the WEU conducted two 
joint actions in the Gulf In 1987-1988, following the laying of mines in the Persian Gulf 
during the Iran-Iraq war, the "Operation Cleansweep" helped to complete the clearance of 
a 300-mile sea-lane from the Straits of Hormuz. During the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the 
WEU coordinated mine-clearance operations, and helped enforce and controlling the 
economic embargo. After the cession of hostilities it continued its mission and contributed 
to the humanitarian actions for Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq.84 The adoption of a 
security role for the EU in 1991 led to a compromise between those who were less than 
enthusiastic about the political union, and those who wanted to emphasize the political 
aspects. One of the results of this compromise was the incorporation of the WEU through 
the Maastricht Treaty (MT). The idea of the WEU becoming an integral part of the 
development of the Union was firmly stated in the MT, but it also reflected the WEU's 
pivotal role between the EU and NATO. 85 
Parallel to the achievement of the MT, the WEU Ministers approved on 10 December 
1991, two Declarations, which marked the starting point for the changes in the WEU. The 
first WEU Declaration entitled "The Role of the Western European Union and its 
Relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance" underscored and reaffirmed 
the existing dual loyalty. It stated that the "WEU will be developed as the defense 
component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar in 
the Atlantic Alliance." It affirmed that the WEU would develop its own operational role, 
which would involve the creation of the Planning Cell, the meetings of the WEU chiefs of 
defense staffs and the setting up of military units answerable to the WEU. To facilitate 
working relationships with the EU and NATO, it was decided to move the Secretariat 
General of the WEU to Brussels and to provide continuous representation on the WEU 
Council. The second WEU Declaration was an invitation to all members of the EU to 
become members of the WEU or to become Observers, and to all other European 
members of NATO to become Associate Members of the WEU. 
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Meeting on 19 June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers issued the Petersberg 
Declaration. This declaration attempted to answer some of the shortcomings of the WEU 
and provided some substance to the Maastricht declarations. The first part emphasized the 
interdependence nature of the European Security architecture, especially the "importance 
of strengthening the role and institutions of the CSCE" and on the implementation of the 
Maastricht Declarations. The second part dealt with defining and strengthening the 
operational role of the WEU. It is probably the element for which the Petersberg 
Declaration is the best known. Apart from common defense, the units answerable to the 
WEU could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks 
of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These missions are 
usually referred to as the Petersberg tasks. All members also agreed to make available 
military units from "the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military 
tasks conducted under the authority of the WEU." The third part outlined the relations 
between the WEU and the member states of the EU and NATO. 
Another important event for the development of the WEU was the NATO Summit 
held in January 1994. The issued statement gave its full support for the development of 
the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). In other words, it meant the 
strengthening of the European Pillar of the Alliance through the WEU. It also expressed 
its readiness to make Alliance assets and capabilities available for WEU' s operations. 86 
The plan that was endorsed, created separable but not separate, multinational units that 
could be detached from the main NATO structure if necessary. These units acquired the 
name of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The purpose of this concept, approved at 
the Berlin meeting of the NATO defense Ministers in 1996, is to facilitate cooperation 
between member and nonmember states in peacekeeping and other operations under the 
command of NATO, or in the case NATO decides not to participate, under the command 
of the WEU with approval of the North Atlantic Council. 87 
If on one side it is believed that this concept opened the way to a significant 
reinforcement of the WEU' s operational capabilities, many believe that it will create 
barriers by hindering Europeans ability to organize major military missions if Washington 
were against it. Since any WEU-led mission needs. the approval of the North Atlantic 
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· Council, there will be a bar upstream, 88 and control, surveillance and framing 
downstream89 during operations that require CJTF inputs.90 As Frederic Bozo puts it 
"either you cannot count on the engagement of the United States, and then it is dangerous 
for the Europeans to be excessively dependent on the good will and means of the 
Americans in NATO, either this engagement is secured but then it becomes vain to claim 
for more European autonomy in NATO".91 
Responding to the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1996, the WEU issued the 
Brussels Declaration in July 1997. In this declaration the Ministers reaffirmed their efforts 
to provide the EU with access to an operational capability in the context of the Petersberg 
tasks and to develop the ESDI within NATO. They agreed on practical arrangements for 
the participation of all EU Member states in WED operation undertaken in accordance 
with Article 17 (2) of the Amsterdam Treaty, thus enhancing the operational role of the 
observers. A set of arrangements for enhanced cooperation was also stipulated. 
The year 1999 marked a tum in the course followed by the WED. In June 1999, at 
Cologne, the EU committed itself to ensure that it would have at its disposal the 
appropriate capabilities and instruments to take decisions on the full range of the 
Petersberg tasks. This commitment was formalized in concrete objectives at the Helsinki 
European Council in December 1999. 92 In this context the WED Ministerial Council 
issued the Luxembourg Declaration in November 1999. In this declaration, the Ministers 
welcomed the new developments of the Cologne Summit and reaffirmed their readiness to 
support these initiatives. This support would be achieved by working in close cooperation 
and would allow direct access to expertise and operational structures. In the declaration 
there is question of including those functions to the EU that are necessary, not the whole 
of the WED. This seems to be a considerable change of tone in comparison with previous 
declarations. Other important points in the Declaration were those dealing with the 
completion of the WED audit of assets and capabilities for European crisis management 
operations. 
The rest of the Declaration consisted of acknowledgement of different issues going on 
at that time: the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) operation going on in 
Albania, the Kosovo and Croatia situation, the operational development of the WED, the 
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development of the Eurocorps and other formations, the relations with the OSCE, Russia, 
Ukraine, the Mediterranean dialogue, the Cyprus issue, and the appointment of Solana to 
the post of Secretary-General of the WEU. 
4.2.2. Signs of expansion 
This section will look at the practical consequences for the WEU in terms of 
functional integration. The period covered runs from the mid-1980s until now and focuses 
especially on the results of the WEU Declarations of 1991 and subsequent declarations as 
they are the foundation for the WEU as it is known today. Five categories will be 
reviewed: membership, structure, missions, means, cooperation and accomplishments. 
4.2.2.1. The membership 
The best way to understand certain arrangements in the other categories is to start with 
exploring the membership or memberships, as there are different statuses within the 
organization. The WEU is currently made up of 28 countries, counting four types of 
status: Member State, Associate Member, Observer and Associate Partner. There are 
several reasons that explain those differences in status. Certain states have a policy of 
neutrality or their commitment to NATO is more valued. Another fact is that some 
countries are not members of the European Union but are linked with it through 
agreements (Appendix A). 
The original members in 1954 were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Portugal and Spain joined as Member States in 
1990 and Greece in 1995. All are signatories of the Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT). This 
commits them to respect the values and principles guiding the WEU; to accept the 
decisions? rules and agreements adopted in conformity to the Brussels Treaty; to develop 
the WEU as the defense component of the EU and the European Pillar of NATO. As full 
members, they have full decision-making rights, which applies the consensus rule, in the 
WEU.93 
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The Maastricht Declaration in 1991 invited states that were members of the EU to 
accede to the WEU or to become observers. As already mentioned, Greece became a 
Member State and Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Denmark joined as Observers. 
At the same time, other European Members of NATO were invited to become Associate 
Members - Iceland, Norway and Turkey joined as such. Later in 1999, following their 
accession; to NATO, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined as Associate 
Members. 94 Observers and Associate Members can attend meetings of the WEU Council, 
unless a majority of Member States decides otherwise. They also have the same rights and 
responsibilities as the Member States for functions transferred to the WEU from other 
institutions to which they already belong. Observers may be invited to speak or to attend 
meetings of working groups. Associate Members are associated to the Planning Cell 
through a permanent liaison arrangement. They may associate themselves with decisions 
and participate to their implementation unless a majority of Member States decides 
otherwise. They have the right to speak but cannot block a decision that was taken by 
consensus, they are also asked to make a financial contribution to the organization's 
budget.95 
In May 1994, the status of Associate Partners was created. It covered the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, which signed a European Agreement with the EU. Ten 
countries became Associate Partners at that time: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The latter three 
changed their statuses to Associate Member in 1999. Efforts have been made to include 
the Associate Partners participation, as such their contributions to various phases of crisis 
management process (planning and force creation) have been defined. Liaison 
arrangement have been established allowing their military representatives to be informed 
about activities, and security agreements have been signed to provide legal basis for the 
exchange of classified documents.96 
With this constellation, depending on the topics on the agenda, the Council meets 
either with 21 or 28 countries. In recent years, measures have been taken to enable all 
Member States, Associate Members and Observers to participate in all WEU operation. 
Also, the participation of all the countries in the political activities has grown at an ever-
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increasing extent. However, regarding the different status and especially the different 
rights and duties associated with it, it is easy to imagine the many problems with which 
this complex setting will be faced. 
4.2.2.2. The structure 
Compared with its original structure (the Council, the Permanent Council, the 
Secretary General, the Chiefs of Defense Staff and the Parliamentary Assembly), the 
awakening period and recent years have witnessed an extreme proliferation of entities and 
tasks associated to them. The structure (Appendix B) of the organization can be divided 
into mainly three categories: the decision-making structure, the support structure and the 
liaison-dialogue structure. 
The first category encompasses the Council, the Chiefs of Defense Staff, the Military 
Delegates Group, the Military Committee and the Working Groups. The Council is 
considered the main body and addresses all security defense matters concerning the WEU. 
It is organized so that it can exercise its function on a permanent basis and be convened at 
any time. The Council of Ministers is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Defense, since 1984, and meets every six months. The Permanent Council is responsible 
for the day-to-day management of the whole organization and the coordinating and 
tasking of the activities of its Working Groups. It is composed of permanent 
representatives and meets on a weekly basis with either 21 or 28 countries in attendance. 
The Presidency used to be a one-year term. In order to adjust to the practice of the EU, in 
1994 it started rotating every six months. 
The Chief of Defense Staff (CHODS) was revived in 1984, and at Petersberg in 1992, 
it was decided they would meet twice a year prior to the Ministerial Councils and on an ad 
hoc basis whenever necessary. At the same time, it was also decided to establish a 
Military Delegates Committee (MDG). Their tasks include the preparation of CHODS 
meetings, the evaluation and advice on the military aspects of all planning and the 
monitoring of the military aspects of the Planning Cell's work. On the military level it was 
decided in May 1997 to establish a WEU military committee. This committee is 
considered the senior military authority in the WEU, working under the authority of the 
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Council. It is responsible for the general conduct of the WEU' s military affairs. It is 
composed of the Chiefs of Defense Staff represented in permanent session by the Military 
Delegates Committee (MDC). 
The Working Groups are divided in three types: the ones that have standing missions, 
the ones that are given specific mandates on issues with long-term implications, and the 
ones that deal with specific subject areas. 
There are six standing groups. The Council Working Group (CWG) consists of 
national representatives and prepares all the Council meetings. The Politico-Military 
Group (PMG), also composed of national delegates, provides the Council with politico-
military support on issues concerning the operational role of the WEU. The Space Group 
(SGS) deals with the WEU's space activities. The Budget and Organization Committee 
(BOC) examines all the financial and personnel requirements and prepares 
recommendations for decisions by the Council. The Security Committee (SC) is 
composed of representatives of the National Security Authority of each Member State. It 
meets twice a year and is supported by the Security Committee Working Group (SCWG). 
The Communications and Information Systems Committee (CISC) meets three times a 
year and is composed ofcivilian and military experts. 
There are two long-term issue groups. The Special Working Group (SWG), composed 
of seniors of the Foreign and Defense Ministries, carries out political studies with long-
term implications. The Defense. Representatives Group (DRG) does the same for defense 
issues. 
There are four specific subject groups. The Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG) 
deals with CJTF-related issues. The Mediterranean Group analyses the situation in the 
Mediterranean and dialogues with the seven non-WEU Mediterranean partners (Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). The CFE verification experts 
and Open Skies Experts Groups monitor the implementation and arms control and 
disarmament agreements. 
Some working groups result from the transfer of certain activities from the former 
Eurogroup97 of 13 European NATO countries. These countries are Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
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Turkey, the United Kingdom and, since 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
Since 1997, Observers and Associate Partners were involved in some of the activities of 
these groups. There are four such groups. The EUROLONGTERM promotes effective 
long-term military planning between WEU nations with a view to determine military 
capabilities and equipment requirements beyond a 10-year time-frame. The EUROCOM 
promotes interoperability between the tactical communications systems of the land forces. 
The Western European Logistics Group (WELG) examines the logistics support needs for 
operations. The Council Working Group on the Transatlantic Forum manages all 
Transatlantic Forum Activities. 
The second category or support structures at the WEU headquarters in Brussels are the 
Secretariat-General and the WEU Military Staff with its Planning Cell and its Situation 
Center, and the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the Satellite Center in 
Torrejon, Spain. The Secretariat-General is in charge of preparing and organizing the 
activities of the Council and of maintaining the contact with the WEU' s subsidiary bodies 
and a number of international organizations. It is headed by the Secretary General, Javier 
Solana, who chairs the meeting of the Permanent Council, represents the organization and 
is responsible for the running of the headquarters. 
The WEU Military Staff is made up of the new Military Committee of 1997, the 
Planning Cell and the Situation Center. The latter were created in the margins of the 
Maastricht Summit in 1991 and refined with the Petersberg Declaration. The Cell became 
operational in April 1993. Due to its composition it is able to draw on a wide range of 
expertise. In normal times, it prepares plans for the employment of forces answerable to 
the WEU, keeps an up-date list of forces and combinations of forces which might be 
allocated for specific operations, establishes an inventory of rules of engagement and a set 
of standing operational procedures for the selected operation headquarters, coordinates 
programs of exercises and, finally, it contributes to broader thinking on the formulation of 
a military capability of the WEU. In an emerging crisis it is supposed to monitor the 
situation and follow the situation, to give its views to the WEU politico-military 
authorities on the practicability and nature of any WEU involvement, to prepare 
recommendations for the necessary command, control and communications arrangement 
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for each operation, to draw up the relevant contingency plans, and to coordinate the 
preparation of the deployment of forces under WEU auspices until this function is 
assumed by a selected operation headquarters. 98 
The Birmingham Council of May 1996 decided to make permanent the creation of the 
Situation Center and the Information Section within the Cell. They would both be basic 
elements of crisis management. The Center would take advantage of the experience 
acquired with the CRISEX 95-96 exercise and would receive means for the presentation 
of military situation and equipment of transmission. This would facilitate the direct 
dialogue between the representatives of the Council and the Commandant of the 
operation. At the same time security agreements with NATO were signed to allow a 
greater exchange of confidential documents between the two organizations. In matters of 
confidential information the issue is a complex and delicate one, made even more 
complex with the different Memberships. 
The Situation Center (SIT-CENT) had, since its creation, the mission to present in 
purely descriptive way the situation of unstable spots selected by the Council. The 
information used came from public military and civilian sources. This contrasts with the 
Information Section, which received classified and confidential information. This situation 
' 
is explained by the fact that the information, especially coming from NATO, that landed 
in the Information Section only benefited the members of the WEU that are also members 
of NATO, as with the Situation Center the information was dispatched to all the members, 
including those who are not member with NATO. In its relations with the EU the same 
kind of phenomena occurred. The reports of the diplomatic missions at the EU were 
transmitted to the Situation Center two or three times a week but could not be given to the 
Associate Members and Associate Partners who were not members of the EU. 
This situation and other pressures have led to the decision to integrate the Situation 
Center in the military structure of the Cell, removing its civilian-military composition. 99 
Most of the information gathered globally comes from the capitals and especially from the 
U.S. The U.S. transmits some to NATO, who in tum transmit some to the WEU. This 
dependence on the US has highlighted the necessity to reinforce the means of national 
information intra-Europe. 
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Since April 1991, the development of European cooperation in space activities for 
security purposes, decided to set up a Satellite Center. Inaugurated in Torrejon in 1993 it 
became a WEU subsidiary body in May 1995. Its main function is to analyze for security 
purposes imagery from satellite and airborne sources relating to areas of interest to the 
WEU. 100 The interpretation of images is first given to the Council, then to member States 
to help them in their preparation work for urgency and conflict situation and, eventually, 
to international organizations (OSCE, UN) if the Council of the WEU so decides. 
Commercially available imagery gathered by satellites101 is used as well as high-resolution 
imagery from the Franco-Italian-Spanish Helios defense observation satellite. 102 The 
results of the audit103 on its capabilities carried out by the WEU has showed that much 
still needs to be achieved in the field. 
The Institute for Security in Paris was created in July 1990. Its purpose is to help 
promote a European security and defense identity. Although the Institute is answerable to 
the WEU Council, it benefits from a large degree of independence in its work. Its main 
tasks are research and analysis, contribution to the wider debate on European security 
issues and stimulating more effective links between institutes in all the 28 WEU nations, 
as well as in North America, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries. 104 
The third and final category is called the liaison and dialogue relationships, and 
involves the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, the Western European Armaments 
Organization (WEAO), and the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). The 
Assembly was one of the original entities of the WEU. It holds its sessions in Paris, where 
its permanent seat is located. Its 115 members meet twice a year in plenary. Its main task 
is to bring European security questions to the notice of national parliaments and public 
opinion. WEU Associate Members take part in the activities of the Assembly and the 
work of its committees. Observers and Associate Partners have a specific status. There is a 
Presidential Committee made up of the Bureau, committee chairs, and representatives of 
the political groups and the Associate member delegations. There are also six permanent 
I 
committees and one standing committee, which may be convened any time to adopt on 
behalf of the Assembly a position on topical subjects which require a rapid response. 
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The WEAG has been established in order to transfer armaments cooperation from the 
Independent Programme group (IEPG)105 to the WEU. The participating nations are 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Its objectives now are a more 
efficient use of resources through increased harmonization of requirements, the opening 
up of national defense markets to cross-border competition, the strengthening of the 
European Defense Technological and Industrial base, and the cooperation in research and 
development. The WEAO created in 1996 is the first European armaments body with 
international legal personality. It is designed to allow an evolutionary approach to a 
European Armaments Agency. 106 
4.2.2.3. The missions 
Another sign of the WEU' s expansion in different directions is the widening of its 
mission range. Apart from its original mission, which is to contribute to the common 
defense of its member in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article 
V107 of the modified Brussels Treaty (MBT), the Petersberg Declaration has committed 
the WEU to a whole new range of tasks. These tasks, usually referred to as the 
"Petersberg Tasks", include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks 
of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Their nature implies a 
different conception and approach in terms of conventional warfare. They also triggered 
the development of the operational role of the WEU as will be seen in the next section. 
In combination with the military development, the WEU has also intensified its 
relations with other countries. Through the Transatlantic Forum the WEU explains 
European security and defense policies to a wider North American public. This Forum 
took over the Transatlantic Publicity Activities of the former Eurogroup, which were 
transferred to the WEU in 1994. The activities include the organization of a European 
Seminar held annually in the Transatlantic Forum Presidency's country and an annual 
conference in Washington. 
As Russia and Ukraine are considered to play an essential role in Europe's security 
and stability, the WED has developed relations consisting of political consultations and 
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practical cooperation on subjects of mutual interest. These relations are concretized 
through regular consultations between the Secretary-General and the Russian and Ukraine 
Ambassadors, through meetings with visiting senior members of the Russian and Ukraine 
Government, through meetings of parliamentarians, and through joint activities involving 
the WEU Institute for Security Studies and Russian and Ukraine counterparts. Other forms 
of cooperation are the initiation with Russia in November 1995 of a cooperation between 
the WEU Satellite Center and the Russian center, imagery is provided on a commercial 
basis. 
A Mediterranean dialogue was initiated with seven non-WEU countries108 to inform 
them about the WEU's activities and to exchange views on subjects of mutual interest 
with a special focus on crisis management. The dialogue has taken the form of regular 
meetings between representatives from the Brussels embassies. 
In 1995, a dialogue was established with Cyprus and Malta - two countries which have 
applied for membership of the European Union. Since 1996, the WEU has also 
considered, as part of its international efforts, to assist African countries in developing 
effective peacekeeping capabilities. 109 
4.2.2.4. The means 
The decision at Maastricht to make the WEU its defense arm has enhanced 
significantly the capability to act collectively. This development did not emerge from 
nowhere but was the consequence of lessons learned during the Gulf War and the Ex-
Yugoslavia operations and of an organized will of some countries like France and 
Germany. 110 
The development of its operational role started with the negotiations of the Maastricht 
Treaty but came to maturity with the Petersberg Declaration, which set out the provisions 
to conduct crisis prevention and crisis management operations. 
There are essentially three types of operational tools. The first encompasses the efforts 
within the institutional frame of the WEU that permit the standardization and 
interoperability in the fields of logistics, military transportation, air and naval forces and 
the acquisition of armament. The second category involves all the new subsidiary entities 
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of the Council of the WEU that are designated to run the growing and strengthening 
operational function - (military committee, the Planning Cell, the Satellite Center). The 
third category regroups the so-called Forces Answerable to the WEU made up of national 
units and a number of multinational formations (FAWEU) and, since 1996, of the CJTF111 
ofNATO. 
It is important to look more closely at the FA WEU and understand the principles they 
are based upon. The WEU has no permanent forces or command structure of its own. 
Consequently the Petersberg Declaration states that "WEU Member States declare that 
they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their 
conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of the WEU''. 
Forces and headquarters employed in a particular WEU operation (principle of case-by-
case) are to be drawn from the databases, held and updated annually by the Planning Cell. 
The databases list the units and headquarters made available by the WEU members. These 
military units have to be organized on a multinational and multi-service basis. The 
participation in specific operations and decisions to make forces available remains, 
however, a sovereign decision of the Member States and are determined after consultation 
with NATO in the case of forces with NATO missions. 
Since 1993, with the Council of Rome, a number of multinational formations have 
been officially designated as FA WEU. Such formations provide pre-package capabilities 
with associated headquarters and are an important element of the overall forces that the 
WEU selects to meet specific contingencies. At present there are seven of these 
multinational formations. 
The first and most important in size is the EUROCORPS (European Corps) composed 
of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain ( discussed more fully in section 
4.3). The six others are the Multinational Division, the UK-Netherlands Amphibious 
Force, the EUROFOR, the EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force), the Headquarter 
of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps, and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force. 112 
The Multinational Division Central (MNDC) comprises four brigades - two airborne 
and two airmobile - from the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. 
The United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force is essentially a light infantry brigade 
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whose priority role is amphibious warfare. The EUROFOR or Rapid Deployment Force 
has its headquarter in Florence and provides forces coming from France, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal. The force is a rapid-reaction land capability, equipped with easily deployable 
light forces with a level of availability adapted to missions to be carried out. The size of 
the force may vary from a small formation to a light division. The EUROMARFOR is a 
non-standing, pre-configured, multinational force having both maritime and amphibious 
capabilities. The Force Commander is assigned for a one-year term on a rotational basis 
between ALFLOT (Spain), CECMED (France), CINCNAV (Italy) and CONNAV 
(Portugal), which are contingents of each respective country. The Headquarters of the 1st 
German/Netherlands Corps, located in Munster, declared in 1997 its preparedness to 
provide co~and and control support for operations under WEU auspices. The Spanish-
Italian amphibious force created in 1997 is the merging of preexisting national forces. It is 
a pre-structured, non-permanent force, whose national amphibious components retain their 
operational and organic chains of command. 113 
As already mentioned, the WEU has no permanent forces or command structure since 
no military command or control assets are permanently assigned to the organization. 
Consequently, in normal times, the WEU can call upon the forces described above. In 
operations decided by the Council, national, multinational or alliance assets provide the 
military command and control chain of the operational headquarters and its commander is 
the point of contact between the operation commander and the operation and the WEU 
Council. 
For the crisis management process, the WEU has established four phases. The crisis 
build-up phase which starts when the Council decides to address the crisis situation. At 
that point the Politico-Military Group, with the support of the Secretariat-General, the 
Planning cell, the Situation Center and the Satellite Center, are asked to monitor and 
assess the situation and report to the Council. The second phase begins when the Council 
decides if there is a possible involvement of the WEU. The Planning Cell is than asked to 
draft contingency plans to include the force mission, possible force packages and 
command and control arrangements. The Military Committee advises on the contingency 
plan and on the feasibility of the options. The Political-Military presents its harmonized 
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political and military advice on the finalized plan to the Council. At that stage, the Council 
can take the following decisions: take action in accordance with one of the options of the 
contingency plan, take no immediate action but continue crisis monitoring, or take no 
WEU action at all. The third phase is launched when the formal decision of taking action 
is decided. The Council decides then on the force mission and composition, the 
Operational Headquarters and Commander and the nation to nominate the Force 
Commander. It also designates a Point of Contact to serve as the Operation Commander's 
permanent correspondent at WEU headquarters in Brussels. Subsequently, the Council 
agrees on the Operation Plan formulated by the Operation Commander. During the fourth 
phase, the Council exercises politico-military control of the WEU operation with the 
support of the relevant bodies. The Politico-Military Group presents the Council an 
overall analysis of the situation on the basis of information supplied by the Point of 
Contact. It also presents politico-military advice, acts as interface between the council and 
the Operation Commander, coordinates the nations' points of view on matters affecting 
the operation and monitors the progress of the operation. 114 
4.2.2.5. Cooperation and accomplishments 
In terms of cooperation, different categories can be identified, beside those already 
mentioned such as the multinational formations, the Satellite Center, the activities in the 
working groups. These categories can be broadly defined as the relationship of the WEU 
with the EU and NATO, the joint exercises and the operations. 
The signs of the WEU' s willingness to fit into the EU and NATO are numerous. 
Regarding the relations with the EU, a whole series of measures can be found in the 
Maastricht Declarations (1991), the Brussels Declaration (1997) and the Luxembourg 
Declaration (1999). For example, in order to develop a close working relationship with the 
EU, the WEU promises to synchronize the dates and venues of meetings and harmonize 
working methods, to establish close cooperation between the Council and the Secretariat-
General of the WEU and the Council and General Secretariat of the Union. It promises to 
harmonize the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies as well as the 
administrative rules and practices. It promises to arrange modalities to ensure that the 
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Commission of the EU is regularly informed and consulted on activities related to the 
CFSP and encourage a closer cooperation between the WEU Parliamentary Assembly and 
the European Parliament. Finally, it also promises to allow the relevant bodies of the EU, 
including its Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), to draw on the WEU's 
resources. Equivalent measures towards NATO can be found in these Declarations. 
Another element of cooperation worth mentioning between the WEU and the EU is the 
continuing process of reflection on the framing of a Common European Defense Policy 
(CEDP), based on a pragmatic approach identifying building blocks and considering 
inventory work. 115 
In order to demonstrate the solidarity and the political will of WEU nations, as well as 
to test the validity and to improve the operational objectives, a rolling five-year joint 
exercises program has been drawn up. CRISEX 95/96 was the first WEU crisis 
management exercise carried out. The scenario depicted a peacekeeping mission that a 
military force was to carry out in three phases. The first phase involved the politico-
military strategic command, the second phase the military strategic level and the third 
phase saw . the actual deployment and operation of a multinational headquarters in a 
simulated theater of operations. In June 1997, the Eurocorps conducted the exercise 
COBRA 97 which was monitored by the WEU Planning Cell, and in July, a crisis 
management seminar ATHENA 97 was organized for the WEU headquarters 
representatives. In November 1998, the exercise CRISEX 98 took place to test the 
politico-military decision-making procedures. It ,was an improved version of CRISEX 
95/96. In this case, the arrangements for observing the exercise provided an opportunity to 
explain the WEU' s decision-making mechanisms and procedures to various non-member 
countries and partner institutions. That same year Turkey conducted a maritime exercise 
DOGU AKENDIZ 98. CRISEX 99 took place in June 1999 and was based on CRISEX 
95/96 and CRISEX 98. The Eurocorps also conducted the PELIKAN 99 exercise 
monitored by the WEU Planning Cell. A Joint WEU/NATO CRISEX/CMX took place in 
February 2000, where the WEU requested the use of NATO headquarters, assets and 
capabilities. This was done to harmonize the planning procedures with NATO. 116 
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Three operations have been conducted by the WEU in connection with the former 
Yugoslavia. The combined NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard, in support of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 820, was launched in 1993. It enforced the arms 
embargoes and economic sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. In the course of the 
operation the WEU deployed four ships, and six maritime patrol and early warning 
aircraft. Since that time almost 6,000 ships were inspected at sea and more than 1,400 
were diverted and inspected at port. The Danube Operation, also started in 1993, was to 
assist the riparian states (Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) in implementing the Danube 
embargo. Seven WEU members (Italy, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom) have contributed to this non-military operation. At its 
height the operation involved 250 WEU personnel, active in a coordination and support 
center and three control areas. Equipped with 8 patrol boats and 48 vehicles, 6,748 
inspection and monitoring operations were carried out. This operation was a practical 
example of concrete cooperation with the Associate Partner, within the WEU and of 
OSCE-WEU coordination. 
In September 1994, responding to a request made by the EU, the WEU participated in 
the planning and establishing of the EU civil administration of the city of Mostar by 
contributing to a police contingent. The aim was to assist the Bosnian and Croat parties to 
set up a unified police force for the town. In May 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden were 
authorized to contribute, which brought the force to its maximum strength of 182 
individuals during the summer. The operations ended in October 1996 when the executive 
powers of the EU Special Envoy were transferred to the local authorities. 117 
In 1997, the WEU deployed the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in 
Albania. The aim of this mission was to rebuild the Albanian police by a process of 
modernization and to gradually transfer the training functions to it as well. 118 The mission 
was expanded in 1999 and main innovation of the new Operation Plan was that training 
and advice were now given throughout the country and down to police unit level. The 
current strength in Albania is 144, with personnel from 22 WEU nations 119. 
Beginning in November 1998, the WEU Satellite Center has carried out a mission of 
"general security surveillance" of the Kosovo region. Since July 1999, its work is 
64 
concentrated on the finalization of a Geographic Information System (GIS) on Kosovo. 
The GIS is a digital map of the entire Kosovo region with visualization and analysis tools 
and can be used to assist several aspects of reconstruction work (including demining) in 
Kosovo. 120 
At the request of the EU, since May 1999 the WEU is implementing a joint action in 
the field of mine clearance called Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia (WEUDAM). 
It provides advice, technical expertise and training support to the Croatian Mine Action 
Center (CROMAC) in the areas of program management, planning and project 
development, geographic information systems and in Level II Survey. Sweden acts, as 
lead nation for this mission comprised 9 individuals from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden.121 
4.3 The Eurocorps 
4. 3.1. The history 
The Eurocorps is originally a French-German initiative. The German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl and the French President Franyois Mitterrand announced its creation on May 
22, 1992, during the La Rochelle summit. The origin of the French-German security 
cooperation is linked to the Elysee Treaty of 1963, which outlined a broad political and 
defense cooperation. In 1987, France and Germany created a joint brigade of 4,000 troops. 
In 1988, they established a joint Defense and Security Council to oversee the brigade and 
identify other areas of cooperation.122 The Eurocorps enlarged the existing Franco-
German brigade to a corps-level unit of 35,000 troops. Belgium joined soon after, so that 
by October 1993 at the official creation of the Eurocorps in Strasbourg, the ceremony was 
headed by the Defense Ministers of the three first participating countries. 
Among the texts that shaped the Eurocorps, four are considered as founding texts. The 
Report of La Rochelle of May 1992, signed by the Ministers of Defense, defined its 
missions and responsibilities, structures and subordination. It stated that the Eurocorps 
could be the basis for a European corps in which other member countries of the WEU 
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could participate and that it should be a model for narrower military cooperation between 
the Member States of the WEU. 123 The second document is the Declaration of Petersberg 
in June 1992, where the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense expressed their intent to 
strengthen the operational role of the WEU, listing the missions that could be given to 
Member States' armed forces. The third document is the SACEUR-Agreement signed in 
January 1993 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It defines the missions that could be given to the 
Eurocorps and the conditions of use within the military structures of NATO. This 
agreement was complemented in May 1995 by the SHAPE's Technical Arrangements. 
This concerned the fields of operational and logistic planning, communications and 
information systems (CIS) support, and funding and infrastructure. The fourth document 
is a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the WEU in September 1993. This 
Memorandum specifies that the Eurocorps can be engaged for Petersberg tasks, and 
develops the general rules and the procedural guidelines applicable to the Eurocorps as a 
multinational Force Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU). It also defined closer links 
between the Euro corps and the Planning Cell of the WEU. 124 
The operational readiness of the Eurocorps was declared in October 1995 after the 
Pegasus 95 exercises. Due to the fact that it took three years, it was not seen as a credible 
effort to deal with the conflict in the Balkans and was often referred to as a "parade 
army". 125 However, being originally a symbol of the construction in the long run of a 
common European defense126, the Eurocorps has improved greatly and become, as will be 
seen in the next sections, an operational reality. 
In response to the decisions of Cologne in June 1999, the Member states of the 
Eurocorps issued the Luxembourg Report. In this report they agreed to adapt the 
Eurocorps and, in particular, the structure of its headquarter (Appendix C) to the new 
strategic environment in order to make it a European rapid reaction corps that would serve 
the European Union and NATO. The first part of the report describes the politico-military 
context in which the Eurocorps has evolved and is evolving, the employment possibilities 
of the Eurocorps and the relations with other countries that are willing to participate in its 
activities. The rest of the report describes in detail how the structure needs to be adapted 
to meet the requirements to become a rapid reaction corps. 127 
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4.3.2. Signs of expansion 
This section will look at the practical consequences for the Eurocorps in terms of 
functional integration. The period starts at the beginning of the 1990s until the decisions 
of Cologne and Helsinki. As with the WEU, five categories will be discussed: 
membership, structure, missions, means, cooperation and accomplishments. 
4.3.2.1. The membership 
Although the opening of the Eurocorps to other European nations was in its principles 
from the start, the number of Member States is very limited. Beside France and Germany, 
who created the Eurocorps in May 1992, only three other European countries joined -
Belgium in June 1992, Spain in July 1994, and Luxembourg in May 1996.128 Three 
reasons explain, for example, the participation of Belgium. First, it allows Belgium to 
participate at the creation of a unit that could be the embryo of a European army. Second, 
it contributes in giving Europe a capacity of action, and third, it can justify national needs 
through a multinational obligation. 129 
The Luxembourg Report has put a restriction on possible Membership possibility for 
the time being. Important adaptations have to be realized in order to create a rapid reaction 
corps. Therefore, the composition of the Eurocorps will stay limited to the actual five 
member states. The emphasis is put on deepening and not on widening. However, it is 
written in the report that other nations are invited to participate in the operation and 
activities of the Eurocorps through the formula of "5 + X''. This formula means that there 
are the five core Member States and that a structure will be put in place so that other 
countries can join in, X representing an undefined number of other countries. 
Related to the membership, one of the problems the Eurocorps has had to deal with is 
the linguistic dimension. It came almost to a situation where all the represented 
languages130 had to be used as working languages. In 1999, the five countries decided to 
adopt English as the operational language and to keep French and German as official 
working languages in the Headquarters at Strasbourg. It is still not an ideal situation in 
terms of communication since the mastering of the three languages represents a permanent 
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challenge. The best solution, especially with the path the Eurocorps is taking, would be to 
work in English like most of the international organizations. 131 
4.3.2.2. The structure 
The main components of the Eurocorps are the Staff, the Headquarters Support 
Battalion and the Forces. The Staff and the Battalion have a multinational staff of about 
1,000 military and civilians, including 200 officers. They are based in Strasbourg, France. 
The internal structure follows the classical pattern of an army corps. The number of 
posts132 by a nation is proportionate to the volume of the forces allocated to the Eurocorps. 
There are two special features that need to be mentioned. 
The first is that the six command and staff functions rotate among the four nations pre-
assigning a division. These include the Commanding General, the first deputy 
Commanding General, the Chief of Staff, both the DCOS (Deputy Chief of Staff) 
Operations and Support and the Chief of the Press and Public Relations Department. The 
other Staff posts are always manned by the same nations according to a preset distribution 
method that can be redefined according to other member states' contributions. 
The second feature is that besides being mainly of terrestrial vocation the staff 
contains a strong Air Force and Navy representation. 
The Luxembourg Report contains the major adjustments that will have to take place in 
order to transform the Eurocorps into a rapid reaction corps. The measures are the 
following: The modification of the peacetime structures of the staff to a G 1-G9 
structure133 (Appendix C); the reorganization of the Headquarters Support Battalion (its 
tasks will be supporting the Staff in peacetime), and, in case of commitment, it will 
providing support on the theatre of operations as well as in the home base in Strasbourg. A 
third measure is the setting up of a "Crisis establishment" of the Staff and Headquarters 
Support Battalion, which will enable a flexible build-up adapted to the situation and 
mission and the easy inclusion of troops and assets provided by other nations. A fourth 
measure is the increase of the command support assets through the setting up of a 
Command Support unit, probably at brigade level. And finally, there will be the expansion 
of available communications assets. 134 
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4.3.2.3. The missions 
According to its orientation and the founding texts the Eurocorps may operate within 
the WEU or NATO. It can be committed in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, to fulfill of UN resolutions or to respond to a request from the OSCE. 
There are three types of uses for the Eurocorps. First, it is to be prepared to carry out 
humanitarian missions and population assistance missions after a natural or technical 
disaster. Second, it is to be available for peace-restoring and peacekeeping missions. 
Third, it may be employed in mechanized operations for a high-intensity combat 
mission. 135 Under NATO, the Eurocorps could be engaged in operation to ensure the 
common defense of the Allies in application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty ( and 
the Brussels Treaty) and for peace-restoring and peacekeeping missions not covered by 
Article 5. In those cases the formula "5+X'' is of application. In the framework of the 
WEU the emphasis rests on the carrying out of Petersberg tasks discussed earlier. 136 
Considering the future of the WEU with the decision of Cologne and Helsinki, this type of 
mission will probably be carried out in the framework of the EU in the future. 
The decision over employment of the Eurocorps remains a responsibility of the 
governments that are represented in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee, composed 
of two representatives per nation (the Foreign Ministry policy director and the chief of 
defense), is charged with fostering the military-political cooperation between the 
participating countries, relations among NATO, WEU, UNO and OSCE, and the 
implementation of the governments' decisions. 137 
The evaluations of crises management operations and lessons learned from those 
operations have generated two generic concepts for the employment of forces. The 
Immediate Mechanized Force (IMF) concept is designed for crisis reaction and peace 
support operations to include peace enforcement missions under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and the Immediate Light Force (ILF) concept, designed for peace support at the 
lower end of the spectrum, is the other. 
In the case of an Immediate Mechanized Force operation, the Eurocorps Commanding 
General is responsible and may assume the function of the Land Component Commander. 
The force can be built up gradually within 20 to 60 days based upon a nucleus of five 
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brigades including the German-French Brigade. In the case of a mobile operation, joint 
and combined air and land operations have to be prepared. 
The Immediate Light Force is especially related to the Petersberg missions and could 
be ready to move in garrisons within a few weeks. The basic composition of this force 
consists of a nucleus of four combat battalions tailored to the specific mission. Due to the 
large array of missions by the Eurocorps, the concept of combat service support has also 
been developed. This notion relies on three basic principles. The participating countries 
bear ultimate responsibility for providing logistic support for forces allocated to the 
Eurocorps. The Commanding General will be given sufficient authority over the national 
logistic resources in order to enable him to deploy and sustain his forces. And third, 
participating countries and the Commanding General have, therefore, a collective 
responsibility for logistic support. 138 
With the issuing of the Luxembourg Report the most probable option of commitment 
of the Eurocorps will be that of crisis management. This can correspond to two situations. 
One is the commitment of its headquarters (ECHQ) as the core of a land component 
command at short notice. In some circumstances, the headquarters could command a 
limited, mainly land force. The other situation is the commitment of its headquarters and 
all or part of its forces as rapid reaction corps for Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. In 
this case, the Eurocorps must be able to integrate other units with a high level of 
availability, including those provided by non-member states. 139 The commitment of 
collective defense stays of course applicable and, in such a case, the Eurocorps would be 
committed as an army corps. 
4.3.2.4. The means 
Units are primarily assigned to the Eurocorps and are scheduled for joint employment. 
The type and size of units are determined according to its missions, possible employment 
and the expected operational outcome. Each nation provides a part of the corps staff and a 
part of the Headquarters Support Battalion. If there are no operational missions, the units 
remain under national command. However, the Commanding General keeps his 
prerogatives in the domains of training and planning. At the moment, the corps counts 
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more than 60,000 men, 800 battle tanks, 1,000 infantry fighting vehicles, 350 artillery 
guns and 600 antitank weapon systems. This structure makes it the most powerful Army 
Corps in Western Europe. 
The contribution of each country is distributed as follows. The French-German 
contribution is a Brigade stationed in M-Ullheim (Germany). The French contribution 
includes a Corps troop (the 53rd Signals Regiment in Luneville) and a staff of force 1 
based in Besanyon (one armored brigade and one mechanized brigade). The German 
contribution consist of the 10th Armored Division, with its HQ in Sigmaringen composed 
of the 12th Armored Brigade in Amberg and the 30th Mechanized Brigade in Ellwangen. 
The Belgian contribution consists of the 1st Mechanized Division, with its HQ in Saive 
near Liege composed of the 1st Mechanized Brigade in Leopoldsbourg, the 7th 
Mechanized Brigade in Marche-en-Famenne, and the 17th Mechanized Brigade in 
Cologne/Spich (Germany). The Spanish contribution consists of the 1st Mechanized 
Division with its HQ in Burgos, which is composed of the 10th Mechanized Brigade in 
Cordoba, the 12th Armored Brigade in Madrid and the 11th Mechanized Brigade in 
Badajoz. And finally, the Luxembourg contribution consists of a reconnaissance company 
(180 soldiers) in Diekirch composed of two reconnaissance platoons, an anti-tank platoon, 
and a logistics support element. This unit was integrated into the Belgian 1st Mechanized 
Division on December 11, 1996. 140 The Eurocorps can be employed either as a whole, 
either some elements according to the FIL and FIM concepts, or either its HQ in part or in 
whole. 141 
4.3.2.5. The cooperation and accomplishments 
This section looks at the Eurocorps' relation with the WEU and NATO, the exercises 
carried out by the Eurocorps and the operations in which the Eurocorps has been involved. 
The SACEUR Agreements signed in January 1993, stipulating the Eurocorps' 
conditions of employment within NATO, came about because of the urgent need to define 
the Eurocorps place next to NATO. These agreements clearly set the Eurocorps' missions 
within NATO, the responsibilities for employment planning, the possible assignment of 
the Eurocorps under the NATO commander, and the responsibilities of the relations 
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between the NATO commander and the Eurocorps command in peacetime. The relations 
are based on two principles. One is that the specificity of the new "multinational European 
task force", will have to be kept as established in the SACEUR Agreements. The second 
principle is that the Eurocorps will adapt itself to NATO structures and procedures, and 
thus allowing a rapid integration into NATO in the case of engagement. 142 
The relation with the WEU started in May 1993 in Rome, when in order to enhance 
the operational role of the WEU, the Corps members decided to put the Eurocorps at the 
WEU' s disposal. The contacts between the Eurocorps and the WEU occur primarily 
through the WEU' s Planning Cell. 143 
The relations between the Eurocorps and the new political-military entities at the 
European Union have not been defined yet, but the Luxembourg Report gives the 
direction in which these relations might evolve. 
The Eurocorps' five-year exercises program has had and still has as purpose the 
following goals: (1) To train the Eurocorps major formations (divisions and brigades) for 
the conduct of mechanized operations in the :framework of a common defense; (2) To 
validate and improve the FIM and FIL concepts either under WEU control or NATO 
command control; (3) To enhance the operational interoperability capabilities between the 
Eurocorps and NATO and between the major formations; and, ( 4) To participate in the 
NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). 
The Command Post Exercise PEGASUS, with the participation of all the major units, 
was carried out annually since 1994 and since 1996, bi-annually. The EUROTRANSITEX 
95 permitted testing the projection of an intervention force through different inter-army 
methods. In the WEU CRISEX 95/96 exercise, the Eurocorps acted as a multinational and 
joint force headquarter. During the COBRA 97 exercise, the Eurocorps tested its concept 
and capability to act as Land Component Commander (LCC) in a mid- to high-intensity 
crisis management scenario including the strategic deployment concept of forces by using 
land, air and sea means of transportation. In October 1998 a Partnership for Peace seminar 
was organized in Strasbourg with the SACEUR' s agreement and support as part of the 
Partnership Work Programs. In 1999, the Eurocorps participated in AFCENT's 
"Cooperative Guard 99" exercise as Land Component Commander (LCC) in a player role 
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and in the LANDCENT' s exercise Cannon Cloud as corps, playing it full responsibility as 
an Army Corps for the common defense in Central Europe. 
Until now, the Eurocorps has been involved in two major operations. It participated, 
beginning June 1999, at the new composite SFOR HQ operation in Sarajevo. The Joint 
Committee gave it the mandate to ensure a visible and credible participation; to sustain the 
participation until the end of the mission; to be involved in the planning process at equal 
level with other NATO HQ' s; and to reach the maximum contribution of the staff and the 
Battalion as identified. About 147 personnel of the Eurocorps HQ were involved, which 
brought the contribution to 37 % of NATO HQ and about 16 % of the total strength of 
SFORHQ. 144 
In January 2000, NATO's North Atlantic Council decided to entrust the Eurocorps 
Headquarters with the mission of providing personnel to form the core element of the 
Headquarters for KFOR III operation145 . The deployment began in March when 80 
soldiers departed from Strasbourg to Kosovo, Pristina and was completed on April 3 when 
the last soldiers arrived. This brings the number to a total of 350 soldiers representing 
about 33 % of the NATO-led peacekeeping KFOR headquarters staff. 146 
4. 4. Conclusions 
4. 4.1. The Western European Union 
The previous section showed that the WEU has, in recent years, expanded its scope in 
a variety of directions and by a variety of means. The claimed purpose was to achieve a 
better security and defense integration of the European countries by the European 
countries, along with the economical and monetary integration. 
Assessing the WEU' s evolution and the latest developments (Helsinki-Cologne) at the 
level of the European Union, the question is raised again if whether the WEU has any 
future role to play within the European security architecture. Or stated differently, can the 
WEU be considered as a success or failure of integration? Looking at the developments in 
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the organization, there is no doubt that the multiplication of functions has had already a 
positive influence on the Member States in terms of cooperation. But maybe because the 
WEU was so eager to achieve this goal, there was a lack of identity and directions. It thus 
has overreached itself and has started to dig its own grave. 
In terms of neofunctional integration the following assessments can be made about the 
conditions Lindberg identified in his analysis. There has been the development of a central 
institution with central policies - the "structure" and "missions" parts in the previous 
section give a good account of those. Problems, however, appear when looking at the 
satisfaction of the four aspects linked with this first condition. 
There is definitely a need in Europe for an independent and reliable security and 
defense capability, but the way to respond to this need is not uniform. In the case of the 
WEU, there has been considerable disagreement between the EU Member States about its 
general purpose and its relationship with the EU. The European Parliament and countries 
like Germany and France, viewed the WEU as the defense component of the EU and 
supported the idea of an eventual merger of both organizations. Britain defended the idea 
of the independence of the WEU from the EU and stressed the role of the WEU as the 
European Pillar of NATO. Certain other EU Member States, such as Denmark, are 
opposed to a defense role of the EU; and Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and Austria have a 
long-standing tradition of neutrality. These conflicting perceptions of the WEU, being an 
adjunct to NATO or the center of a Euro-alternative to the transatlantic ties, have resulted 
in compromises which have led to a confused, not to say a lack of personal, identity. 
If we look at the various declarations during the 1990s the evolving vocabulary is 
enlightening. First, in all the declarations, without exception, there is this dual goal of 
being the defense arm of the EU and the European Pillar ofNATO. If it affirms loud and 
clear its commitment to enhance the role of the EU in defense and security matters, it also 
adopted a sort of subordinated position towards NATO. Considering the global context 
and relations the achievement of both goals might appear contradictory and at some time 
unrealizable. Second, the conception of how the WEU will become integrated in the EU is 
vague and changes over time. In the Maastricht Declarations it was made clear that the 
WEU would be "an integral part of the development of the EU''. Interpretation of these 
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words might differ but the idea that emerges is that, in the future, the WEU, as an 
organization, will be integrated in the EU. The Brussels Declaration displays Article 17 of 
the Amsterdam Treaty that states that there is " ... a view to the possibility of the 
integration of the WEU into the Union ... ", but there is no mention of how this would 
occur. The declaration itself states that the objective is "to build up WEU in stages as the 
defense component of the European Union." In the Luxembourg Declaration, we find 
phrases such as ". . . for the inclusion of those function of the WEU which will be 
necessary for the European Union ... ", " ... allow bodies of the Council of the European 
Union direct access to the expertise of the [different organs] of the WEU .. ", " .. .inclusion 
of those functions which will be deemed necessary by the European Union ... ". This 
evolution translates a fragmentation of the WEU. Third, looking at the different 
arrangements that the WEU has committed itself to in the different Declarations, leaves 
the impression that the organization completely molds itself to fit the expectations of both 
the EU and NATO. At a point it will lose its own "raison d'etre." 
This situation has had repercussions on the WEU' s role and competencies. The 
imposed dual loyalty has pushed the WEU in different directions with abundance of 
tn1ss1ons and of memberships that have led to ambitious tasks and very complex and 
elaborate structures and work relations (see "membership" and "missions" parts). Beside 
the accomplishments in terms of joint exercises and the couple of successful operations 
( see "accomplishments and cooperation" part), the overall result has been one of 
dissatisfaction and lack of credibility of the organization. Some examples of Council 
decisions involving the intervention of the WEU have underscored this lack of credibility. 
In June 1996, a decision was adopted concerning the evacuation of citizens of Member 
States that are in danger in a third country. Despite the fact of potential actions in Congo-
Brazzaville, this text has found no applications. In November 1996, the WEU was asked 
to examine urgently the way it could contribute in operational terms in the region of 
Rwanda. Its answer came three months later and the decision was to dissolve the 
multinational force in place, removing any possibility of intervention. To contribute to a 
solution to the Albania crisis in 1997, a stabilization force could have been established. 
The WEU did not move and it was finally Italy, on an individual basis, that took the 
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initiative. Nor was any contribution made by the WEU to the force established to stop the 
conflicts in Kosovo. 147 
As this thesis did not include the study of the behavior of the persons working or 
involved with the WEU, no specific comments can be given on the fulfillment of the 
second condition that is the elite activation. But, in my opinion, beside the forging of 
personal friendships and camaraderie of expertise, the impact of elite activation must have 
remained very restricted. I present this position for the following reasons. Most of the 
personnel working at the WEU are representatives with a mandate of their respective 
countries, so although their intention and efforts might be oriented to a greater integration, 
their influence in their respective countries might be very limited. Another reason is the 
heterogeneity in composition, there are many countries with aims and motives that are 
sometimes far from reconcilable. Only 10 members of the EU have full membership in the 
WEU, the others have variable statuses. 
The third condition, requiring the spillover effect, is present in all the domains I have 
investigated. Whatever the cause of the spillover effect, a convergence of goals and 
expectations or a lack of agreement, a cyclic pattern can almost be observed. The starting 
point is the successive Declarations, expanding the relations with the EU and NATO and 
the missions which, in turn, push to an expansion of the operational means. But again due 
to a lack of identity, this expansion frenzy has not helped the WEU in becoming more 
efficient. Quite the opposite has occurred. 
The fourth condition, which states the continuity of national policy aims, reflects 
probably why the task of integration is so difficult to achieve. No matter what is said, 
defense and security policies stay very sensitive matters of sovereignty. What is at play 
here is not one country but a myriad of countries with different histories, cultures and 
goals. Techniques such as "minimum common denominator", "splitting the differences" 
and "upgrading common interests" might be well suited for economical integration, but 
their application in the sphere of security and defense is much more delicate. 
In all fairness to the WEU, some positive accomplishments deserve to be highlighted 
here. The WEU has since its reactivation performed the useful function of giving an 
identity to and increasing the visibility of the European security and defense efforts. 
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Although all the operations undertaken by the WEU were not without importance, it 
appears clear that the WEU undertook them more to give the organization a role than 
because it was the most appropriate to perform them. Another important contribution is 
the fact that the WEU represents the only forum, counting 28 countries, in which 
Europeans with common security concerns can discuss those concerns in the absence of 
the Unites States and Russia. 
This is, however, not enough as the need for a credible and independent security and 
defense capability is still there. This recurrent need probably can account for the complete 
change of direction witnessed at the Cologne and Helsinki summits. The agreement on 
common European headline goals, the creation of new political and military bodies within 
the Council, the use of certain assets of the WEU in this new setting are clear 
manifestation of the realization that other things had to be done to get out of the impasse. 
Integration cannot be understood as taking only some parts and leaving the rest behind. 
Therefore, the conclusion about the effectiveness of the WEU in the integration 
process is a divided one. On one side, considering its development and· the valuable 
experience it has acquired these past years, it could be considered as a success. However, 
on the other hand, because of its deficiencies and its partial, versus full, absorption in the 
structure of the EU, it could be considered as a failure in the integration process. Among 
the biggest stumbling blocks are the ambiguity of its identity and the difference in status 
of its Member States. 
In my opinion, the fate of the WEU also demonstrates the power of declarations and 
agreements made in intergovernmental settings and shows how fragile the integration 
process is. In the case of the WEU, the EU treaties and documents, as well as the NATO 
summits, have molded its shape, being and its future. With the recent development, its 
future as an organization is less than assured, no matter the efforts made to keep it afloat. 
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4.4.2. The Eurocorps 
The Eurocorps has as its first merit an effort to symbolize a fundamental reconciliation 
and unprecedented cooperation between the two historical enemies, France and Germany. 
It has come a long way since its creation in 1992, developing itself in an operational 
reality of first quality due to the volume ofits means, its structures and its employment. 
It is probably too early to draw strong conclusion, but the reasons why I believe the 
Eurocorps might evolve towards a success in terms of security and defense integration are 
as follows. Compared with the WEU, it has its own identity with the objectives of being a 
force at the service of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. It is limited in scope ( essentially 
defense) and does not have to deal with a myriad of different membership status. It has 
overcome, in a successful way, major obstacles - a place in the European security 
architecture, differing linguistic/cultural dimensions, and the interoperability dimension. 
Last, but not least, it fits into "the autonomy defense capacity" that the European Union is 
trying to achieve since the decisions in Cologne and Helsinki. 
In terms of neofunctionalism, most of the conditions of Lindberg are satisfied. The 
parts about "structure" and "missions" in the previous sections show the development of a 
central institution with specific policies. The four aspects linked to this first condition 
seem to be satisfied as well. The interests of the Corps' member countries fit into each 
other. The founding texts and the subsequent developments show that there is a shared and 
explicit - how the structures integrate, who is in charge - agreement about the place and 
the role of the corps. The goals and how to achieve them are clearly stated which enables 
it to have a stable and defined identity. That is, it is an independent military instrument 
that is capable of answering the needs of European foreign and defense policy and also an 
instrument that can be at the service of the Atlantic Alliance. This identity and the 
specific goals have provided for a well-defined role and the competencies have been 
improved through the different exercises carried out with NATO and other formations. 
The participation in the SFOR and KFOR III operations have also boosted its credibility 
in being a viable element in Europe's defense ambitions. Elite activation, as with the case 
of the WEU, is difficult to investigate, but it can be said that a lot of improvement has 
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come about working in a multi-lingual and cultural environment. Furthermore, the 
spillover effect is also present here in the sense of improving the capabilities of the corps 
and enabling it to adapt to the new strategic environment. 
Finally Lindberg's fourth condition, which calls for the continuity with national policy 
aims, reflects probably why the task of integration is so difficult to achieve. However, in 
the case of the Eurocorps, due to small number of members and the specific use as an 
instrument of foreign and defense policy agreements, compromises are probably easier to 
achieve and to work out in a positive outcome. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to look at the evolution of a common foreign, security 
and defense policy for the European Union. This evolution was necessary since the 
geostrategic environment has completely changed. The frozen patterns of the Cold War, 
with its great military threat have changed and created an unpredictable international 
environment. This evolution may lead to a genuine political union and reinforce the 
integrative process within the European Union. To assess the prospect of this evolution I 
studied the parts of the major treaties and declarations dealing with this issue and looked 
at the evolution of two military organizations related to the whole process. 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the defense implications that followed 
from it, ~ere born with the Intergovernmental Conference on a Political.Union in 1991. 
They built on the legacy of the European Political Cooperation started some 30 years 
earlier. Foreign, security and defense policies were complex issues since they confronted 
the European Union from the onset with three fundamental problems. The first problem 
concerned the reality of nation-state, reality that placed most of the developments in an 
intergovernmental context. The second problem was the lack of perception of threat, a 
perception that could otherwise crystallize the energies into the achievement of political-
military identity for Europe and legitimize defense budget spending. The third problem 
concerned the relationship between the EU and NATO or, more precisely, the United 
States. This relation raised all kinds of questions, for example, the fear of structure 
duplication, the future of the transatlantic link and so on. 
Although the treaties and latest declarations are still rather timid and prudent steps in 
the right direction of a more forceful and credible CFSP, the degree of cooperation 
between the Member States has certainly increased. It is realistic to say that, despite the 
remaining flaws and obstacles, the process of security and defense integration of the 
European Union will be achieved. The extent to which the CFSP will be capable of taking 
the interests of the Member States to heart and defending the in-common interests, will 
80 
determine the extent to which the Member States will continue to give up their autonomy 
and transfer it to the European institutions. Like the economical and monetary integration, 
it will take time and go through phases of stagnation and setbacks. 
5 .1. Sovereign States towards a Political Integration 
The reality of Nation-States is said to be fading away with the globalization of the 
world. However, the process of political integration witnessed at the European Union 
seem to confirm that the 15 states of the European Union, their positions and ambitions 
still matter. 
The analysis by categories of the provisions of the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Amsterdam Treaty has shown the intergovernmental nature of the whole process. The 
provisions display an approach characterized by compromises and by cautiousness. 
Mechanisms to preserve Member States autonomy and freedom has also been put in place 
through the use of the. unanimity rule, the mechanism of constructive abstention and 
through a formulation that leaves the way open for a wide range of interpretations. 
However, the steps taken and the Declaration issued at the European Council of Helsinki 
in December 1999, have proven the determination of the Member States to go further. To 
date, the time frame has been respected with the inauguration of the interim structures. 
The establishment of the Political and Security Committee, took place as planned on 
March 1, 2000 and of the interim Military Body on March 7, 2000.148 
The informal meeting of the Ministers of Defense at Sintra on February 28, 2000 
agreed on the following items. A broad agreement was reached on how to move towards 
meeting the headline and capability goals the EU has set itself To this end it was decided 
to have a Capabilities Pledging Conference by the end of 2000. The primary focus of 
intervention capability will be on the European region, although it could be possible to 
have it worldwide. Contributions from non-EU European NATO members and from EU 
candidate countries will be invited. And finally, various types of combat brigades are 
being envisaged, plus combat support and combat service support elements. 149 
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For the near future, the EU agenda is composed of the following goals: (1) the 
implementation of the Helsinki decision ( creation of the European security and defense 
bodies); (2) the implementation of the headline goal (creation of rapid reaction force); (3) 
the development of relations between NATO and the EU; and ( 4) the participation of non-
EU members in a European Security and Defense Policy.150 These objectives are good 
signs despite the latest criticisms by a former NATO general who stated that it would take 
at least a decade to create a rapid reaction force, but only if that the Member States would 
make serious financial contributions. 151 
The following recommendations could be made to improve the integration process. 
First, there is still a lack of clear definition of what model the European Union is reaching 
towards and what are the concrete objectives. Will the CFSP stay an intergovernmental 
setting or will it eventually become a community matter like the rest, where the 
commission has its full word to say? Therefore a scenario should be created with precise 
objectives and principles of a common foreign, security and defense policy accepted by all 
Member States. Second, more coherence in the external actions of the European Union 
should. be reached. The creation and the nomination of a High Representative for the 
CFSP are steps in the right direction. However, problems might appear over time in the 
division of tasks between this function and the one of External Affair Representative of 
the Commission. Finally, necessary goals that need to be achieved are the improvement of 
cooperation between institutions, the solving of problems like the limited resources, the 
lack of parliamentary control, and the absence of a pro-active policy. 
5.2. The Military Dimension 
Chapter 4 analyzed the evolution and the impact of the treaties and declarations on the 
WEU and the Eurocorps. These organizations were chosen because they permit to 
development of a military dimension to a common defense policy. These two 
organizations also share the same objective - which is the creation of an independent 
European security and defense. 
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The study of the WEU shows that, over the years, it has expanded its missions, means, 
objectives and accomplishments iri a way that could be defined as successful. At the time 
of its inclusion in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, two options were possible for its 
future development. One option was to remain an independent organization and the other 
was to fusion with the European Union. Almost 10 years later, however, the European 
Union has taken a new path with the Helsinki Declarations. This path leads the WEU in 
neither of the two earlier options. The most likely long-term future for the WEU is that its 
useful components and assets will be transferred to the European Union through the work 
of Javier Solana, who is at the same time the High Representative of the CFSP and the 
Secretary General of the WEU. This action will reduce the substantive responsibility of 
the organization and "put it back to sleep" like its position during most of the Cold War 
period. In the meantime, the WEU is trying to cope with the Helsinki decisions by 
working in three main areas. First, as long as the EU is still in the preparation stage for the 
conduct of European operations, the WEU will remain operational. The present police 
mission in Albania and the de-mining mission in Croatia will continue until the mandate 
expires. Second, the WEU will further develop its politico-military policies, concepts and 
procedures and the partnership with NATO. Third, the WEU acts as a forum for 
information and debate among the 21 nations belonging to either the EU or NATO as well 
as at 28 including our Central European partners. The meetings have already seen some 
good debates about the plans of the 15 and their relevance for the other nations' 
interests. 152 
The Eurocorps has also expanded its missions, means, and accomplishments over the 
last 10 years. If its evolution proceeded unseen or was even dismissed as being a parade 
army, the decisions of Helsinki could pull it to the forefront of the scene. The Eurocorps 
is, in any case, working towards this direction by modifying its structure and intensifying 
its relation with the EU and NATO. 
Another important aspect but that has not been dealt with in this thesis is the European 
armament industry. The audit of assets and capabilities for European crisis management 
carried out by the WEU has revealed many gaps and deficiencies in the European 
capabilities. The lack of adequate military resources has proven to be a serious 
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impediment to any forceful action in the framework of the EPC and the CFSP. Therefore, 
to meet the gaps and resolve the deficiencies and also because it could be a leading force 
in the integration process, it is important to promote a better integration of the armament 
industry. There is, of course, the budget question for the Member States in doing this task. 
Consider the following recommendations. In putting the WEU back to a sleeping stage 
and· taking its best components, special attention and care will have to be provided to the 
states that are going to be felt left out of the whole process (in particular the Associate 
Partners). Already existing tensions could be exacerbated and prove highly destabilizing. 
Concerning the Eurocorps, after its phase of re-modeling and deepening, it will have to 
enlarge to include other European countries if it wants to represent a truly European 
interest and be taken seriously. Concerning the objectives in defense matters, it would 
help if the European Union could give a precise definition of what represents a common 
defense policy and common defense. 
In developing the European defense capacity two limiting conditions should be noted. 
The first is that this defense capacity must take into account the national objectives, 
feelings and features. This concerns the economic interests of the Member States as well 
as their geopolitical interests. The other important limiting condition is that many Member 
States of the European Union are at the same time members of the NATO, and as such 
NATO will continue to be considered as the cornerstone of the European security. The 
issue is not to be for or against NATO or the EU, but of having complementary 
relations. 153 This brings this thesis research to the last point - the relation with NATO and, 
more particularly with the United States. 
5 .3. The Relation with the United States 
The relations with the United States (U.S.) are very important because of the common 
shared history and values. The increased operational capacity of Europe should not create 
the false impression that Europe is now ready to assume responsibility for peace and 
security on its own continent without the U.S. This relationship is, however, an 
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ambiguous one. On one hand, the U.S. has been pushing the Europeans for several years 
to assume greater responsibility in the field of security and defense. On the other hand, if 
the American administration has expressed its support for the new developments, many 
officials have also criticized it. Fears of duplication of means and of threatening of the 
U.S.-European security ties have been expressed. 154 
Therefore to make sure that the new initiative is a success, Europeans and Americans, 
together, should act on the following items. First, Europeans will have to give greater 
priority to actually doing things--for example in Kosovo--than to creating institutions. If 
the EU initiative leads to a new set of structures but has little actual impact on what 
happens on the ground in places like the Balkans, it will not be judged positively. Second, 
the EU states have to make more of an effort to modernize their military forces in areas 
like airlift, sealift, precision guided munitions, cruise missiles, and all-weather and night-
strike capabilities. Third, it should be made clear in the relations with NATO that it is not 
a question of subordinating one organization to another, but rather to take advantage of 
both organizations. Fourth, NATO's assets should be made available for use to the EU. 
NATO has thousands of military planners and staff as well as an extensive network of 
command posts and headquarters throughout Europe. Duplicating these would be costly 
and wasteful, and a poor alternative to making the same assets and personnel (most of 
whom are, in any case, European) available for EU-led missions. And, finally, links must 
be created between the EU and NATO. The previous lack of contact between the two was 
fine as long as the EU was not really a security organization, but it is no longer a suitable 
situation. The creation of separate EU and NATO bureaucracies that do not talk to each 
other can only contribute to divergent transatlantic perspectives, when the goal should be 
to harmonize them. 155 
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NOTES 
1 For more information see the Treaty ofMaastricht. <http://www.eu.europa.int>. 
2 The CFDP, Common Foreign and Defense Policy is not to be confused with the acronym ESDI, European 
Security and Defense Identity. Although both concepts are interrelated, having the same intention for the 
European countries and both were developed simultaneously in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991(Article J.4.1). 
The ESDI has its focus in NATO. The EDSI represents the efforts of the European partners to make a 
greater contribution to their own defense in order to maintain the American commitment at a significant 
level. In other words, it represents the efforts to create a European pillar within the NATO Alliance. This 
has, in recent years, fueled a debate (Europeanist versus Atlanticists) within NATO of how, who and what. 
If indeed, it might strengthen the Alliance by an improved European defense capability and a better burden 
sharing, the fears of its development are numerous. It could, for example, weaken the Alliance by making 
the presence of North American forces seem redundant or by playing down the American leadership within 
NATO by giving Europeans more space to operate independently. At its 1994 Summit in Brussels, NATO 
decided to establish ESDI and made the event even more important by launching the Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) concept. These are designed to be flexible commands, which can be detached from NATO 
main forces for use either by NATO, or by the WEU for European-only missions. The CJTF have since been 
considered both as a move to block European autonomy and as a European recognition of the weakness of 
their military assets. 
Beside the fact that the ESDI is located within NATO and the CFSP within the European Union, another 
difference concerns the memberships of NATO and the EU. Not all the countries that are members of 
NATO are members of the EU and visa-versa. This problem of different and overlapping memberships will 
be discussed in the chapter on the WEU. (European countries members of NATO; Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Britain. Of these countries are not member of the EU: Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey. Countries member of the EU but not of NATO: Austria, 
Finland, Ireland and Sweden). For more details see NATO Defense College, EDSI: A Catalyst for Unity of 
Division within NATO? 8July 1999. 
The debate about European Defense is not a new one, but has regained intensity with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. I will not enter into the details of the debate. For some readings on the subject; Julianne Smith 
and Martin Butcher, "A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO", section 6, Document on European Security 
and Defense Identity (ESDI), Research Report 99.1 January 1999 Basic Publication. 
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"in the three best perfonuing member states in terms of price stability". The estimated reference value for 
1997 (i.e., the non-weighted average of the three best perfonuing states+ 1.5%) is estimated to be 
approximately 3.5%. The second criterion is that the level of annual average long-term interest rates may not 
exceed by more than 2 percentage points the level "in the three best perfonuing member states in terms of 
price stability". The estimated reference value for 1997 (i.e. the non-weighted average of the three best 
perfonuing states+ 2%) is estimated to be approximately 8.0%. The third criterion is that the government 
deficit (total public sector) may not exceed 3.0 % of gross domestic product (GDP), or should be falling 
substantially, or be only temporarily above, though still close to, this level. The fourth criterion is that the 
gross government debt may not exceed 60% of GDP, or must show at least a satisfactory reduction towards 
this figure. In this regard, it is considered that a reduction in the debt ratio in the amount of 2% of GDP 
annually is required in order to be considered as satisfactory. Most Member States will be able to achieve 
this only by reducing their respective annual government deficits to well below the 3% of GDP requirement. 
This will initially be most pertinent in the case of the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. Finally, the fifth 
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criterion is that the currency of a candidate Member State must have belonged for at least 2 years to the 
EMS and the exchange rate must have moved for at least two years within the "normal EMS margins" 
without major tensions or devaluations on their "own initiative". 
For more information consult the webpage: <http://www.euro.pearl-online.com > 
5 Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations: Recommendations for 
Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management Operations. WEU Council of Ministers 
Luxembourg. 23 November 1999. Seewebpage:<http://www.weu.int > 
6 Philip Gordon, An American View of Europe's Security and Defense Ambitions, paper presented at the 
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7 Charles Pentland, Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration. In Groom and Paul 
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9 Supranational refers to a process, a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain 
from unconditional vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreements by means of compromises 
upgrading common interests. Ibid., Keohane,280. 
10lbid., 277. 
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